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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to set out a conceptual framework for explaining variations in the impact of faculty bargaining on institutions of higher education. The conceptual framework is presented in 3 parts. First, a model of the bargaining exchange process is sketched out. Second, an input model describing the structures, processes and behavioral relationships (independent variables) affecting the operation of the bargaining exchange process is developed. Third, an output model identifying the expected consequences of faculty bargaining (dependent variables) is presented. While faculty organizations are likely to have important effects on institutions of higher education, the framework developed illustrates that generalizations concerning the extent of the impact of faculty bargaining are extremely hazardous without determining the way in which forces internal and external to a particular system operate through the bargaining system parameters to produce differential collective bargaining effects. (Author/HS)

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FACULTY BARGAINING: A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION

February, 1973

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ABSTRACT

In the midst of the agitation and turmoil engulfing the American campus in recent years, a number of college and university faculties have turned to a restructuring of power relations in institutions of higher education by adopting the techniques of collective bargaining. While there is a measure of agreement in the literature over the causes of faculty bargaining, there are major disagreements over the probable consequences for the system of higher education of the move towards faculty bargaining. The purpose of this research is to set out a conceptual framework for explaining variations in the impact of faculty bargaining on institutions of higher education.

The conceptual framework is presented in three parts. First, a model of the bargaining exchange process is sketched out. Second, an input model describing the structures, processes and behavioral relationships (independent variables) affecting the operation of the bargaining exchange process is developed. Third, an output model identifying the expected consequences of faculty bargaining (dependent variables) is presented. A number of the concepts used to generate the framework were deduced from available partial theories, while others were grounded in empirical research currently being conducted in New Jersey institutions of higher education.

While faculty organizations are likely to have important effects on institutions of higher education, the framework developed illustrates that generalizations concerning the extent of the impact of faculty bargaining are extremely hazardous without determining the way in which forces internal and external to a particular system operate through the bargaining system parameters to produce differential collective bargaining effects.

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
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I. INTRODUCTION¹

In the midst of the agitation and turmoil engulfing the American campus in recent years, and perhaps in part as a consequence of this unrest, a number of college and university faculties have turned to a restructuring of power relations in institutions of higher education by adopting the techniques of collective bargaining. The faculty bargaining movement in two-year colleges is well underway. It is estimated that the faculty in one-fifth of all two-year institutions in the United States are now represented by bargaining agents (Begin, 1973b). While the bargaining movement has spread to four-year colleges and universities, the movement is not exactly burgeoning, particularly in private institutions where "no union" votes have won in one-third of the elections (Garbarino, 1972a). Since the first four-year institution was organized by the American Federation of Teachers in 1967 (U. S. Merchant Marine Academy), six percent of all four-year institutions have been included in faculty bargaining units (Begin, 1973b). When this information is coupled with low membership figures in many four-year institutions where there are bargaining units, it is not clear that faculty in four-year institutions are completely convinced (Garbarino, 1972a). Nevertheless, a trend towards bargaining is evident.

Many commentators on the origins of faculty bargaining agree that the precipitating forces leading to the organization of college and university faculties are the product of generalized pressures affecting our colleges and universities -- the campus unrest of the 1960's, the shrinking academic job market, increasing external controls, the current financial squeeze and the coverage of faculties in both private and public institutions by labor legislation facilitating the organizational process (for example, see Garbarino, 1971, pp. 1-20). Continuing disaffection with universities by legislatures, students and the public and increasing competition for the tax dollar are certain to reinforce the movement toward the representation of faculties by external bargaining agents.

While there may be a measure of agreement over the causes of faculty bargaining, there are major disagreements over the probable consequences for the system of higher education of the move towards faculty bargaining. One advocate of faculty unionism "believes in [the] collective bargaining process because, being professionals in an employee status, this can reinforce our professionalism (Kugler, 1969, p. 6)." Others are predicting that faculty bargaining will have a largely unfavorable impact on college and university systems.

¹The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions which a number of individuals have made to this document, but particularly my associates on the study of faculty bargaining in New Jersey, Paula Alexander, Steve Browne, Joan Wiskowski, and Jack Chernick, Chairman of the Research Section, Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University.

"...In dividing the university into worker-professors and manager-administrators and governing boards, it imperils the premise of shared authority, encourages the polarization in interests, and exaggerates the adversary concern over interests held in common (Kadish, 1972, p. 122)."

Although it is a reasonable hypothesis that faculty bargaining will bring about changes in traditional modes of academic governance and in faculty-administration relationships, the probable degree and direction of change is not entirely clear. The purpose of this paper is to set out a conceptual framework for explaining variations in the impact of faculty collective bargaining on institutions of higher education. Identification of the nature and the determinants of the probable consequences of faculty bargaining, though necessarily imperfect at the current stage of development of collective bargaining theory, is indispensable to systematic, in-depth studies of institutions in which faculty bargaining is taking place if these studies are to contribute to the development and further organization of knowledge.

The discussion in the following chapters will first sketch out a model of the bargaining exchange process. Second, an input model describing the structures, processes and behavioral relationships (independent variables) affecting the operation of the bargaining exchange process will be developed. Third, an output model identifying the expected consequences of faculty bargaining (dependent variables) will be presented. A number of the concepts used to generate the framework discussed in the following pages were deduced from available partial theories, while others were grounded in empirical research currently being conducted in New Jersey Institutions of Higher Education.² The latter approach served to relate available partial theories to the unique aspects of faculty collective bargaining. Also useful in this respect were conversations over the past year with administrators and/or faculty organization officials from many of the four-year institutions now involved in faculty bargaining.³

²An integral part of the research in New Jersey has been the observation of negotiating activities at Rutgers University since their beginning in 1969, and more recently at other institutions in the state. Interviews with the principle parties and a questionnaire survey of the faculty are also part of the research design. This research was funded initially under an Office of Education grant, for which this document is the final report, and subsequently by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The research will be completed in 1974.

³Central Michigan University, Oakland University, City University of New York, State University of New York, Massachusetts State College System, Southeastern Massachusetts University, St. John's University, Long Island University, Saginaw Valley State College, Pennsylvania State College System, Temple University, Wayne State University.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF BARGAINING MODEL

Introduction

In reviewing the existing literature in respect to industrial relations theory for assistance in formulating a bargaining model, it becomes clear that industrial relations does not possess a body of accepted theory ready at hand for application to a particular instance of collective bargaining. Students of industrial relations have supported this conclusion a number of times over the years (for example, see Somers, 1969).

Nevertheless, the review did point towards the probable relevance of a behavioral theory of the collective bargaining process formulated by Walton and McKersie (1965). The bargaining exchange model developed by Walton and McKersie serves as an extremely useful means for relating the input and output variables, that is, the way in which forces internal and external to a particular system of higher education operate through the bargaining system parameters to produce differential collective bargaining effects. As a result, Walton and McKersie's work will be used, along with other sources, as the basis for identifying relevant variables and explanatory relationships in respect to the impact of faculty bargaining. A general description of Walton and McKersie (1965, pp. 4-6) follows:

The Analytical Framework

Labor negotiations, as an instance of social negotiations, is comprised of four systems of activity, each with its own function for the interacting parties, its own internal logics, and its own identifiable set of instrumental acts or tactics.

We shall refer to each of the distinguishable systems of activities as a subprocess. The first subprocess is distributive bargaining; its function is to resolve pure conflicts of interest. The second, integrative bargaining, functions to find common or complementary interests and solve problems confronting both parties. The third subprocess is attitudinal structuring, and its functions are to influence the attitudes of the participants toward each other and to affect the basic bonds which relate the two parties they represent. A fourth subprocess, intraorganizational bargaining, has the function of achieving consensus within each of the interacting groups.

Distributive Bargaining. Distributive bargaining is a hypothetical construct referring to the complex system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one party's goals when they are in basic conflict with those of the other party. It is the type of activity most familiar to students of negotiations; in fact, it is "bargaining" in the strictest sense of the word. In

4

social negotiations, the goal conflict can relate to several values; it can involve allocation of any resources, e.g., economic, power, or status symbols. What game theorists refer to as fixed-sum games are the situations we have in mind: one person's gain is a loss to the other. The specific points at which the negotiating objectives of the two parties come in contact define the issues. Formally, an issue will refer to an area of common concern in which the objectives of the two parties are assumed to be in conflict. As such, it is the subject of distributive bargaining.

Integrative Bargaining. Integrative bargaining refers to the system of activities which is instrumental to the attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict with those of the other party and which therefore can be integrated to some degree. Such objectives are said to define an area of common concern, a problem. Integrative bargaining and distributive bargaining are both joint decision-making processes. However, these processes are quite dissimilar and yet are rational responses to different situations. Integrative potential exists when the nature of a problem permits solutions which benefit both parties, or at least when the gains of one party do not represent equal sacrifices by the other. This is closely related to what game theorists call the varying-sum game.

Attitudinal Structuring. Distributive and integrative bargaining pertain to economic issues and the rights and obligations of the parties, which are the generally recognized content of labor negotiations. However, we postulate that an additional major function of negotiations is influencing the relationships between parties, in particular such attitudes as friendliness-hostility, trust, respect, and the motivational orientation of competitiveness-cooperativeness. Although the existing relationship pattern is acknowledged to be influenced by many enduring forces (such as the technical and economic context, the basic personality dispositions of key participants, and the social belief systems which pervade the two parties), the negotiators can and do take advantage of the interaction system of negotiations to produce attitudinal change.

Attitudinal structuring is our term for the system of activities instrumental to the attainment of desired relationship patterns between the parties. Desired relationship patterns usually give content to this process in a way comparable to that of issues and problems in distributive and integrative processes. The distinction among the processes is that whereas the first two are joint decision-making processes, attitudinal structuring is a socioemotional interpersonal process designed to change attitudes and relationships.

Intraorganizational Bargaining. The three processes discussed thus far relate to the reconciliation process that takes place between the union and the company. During the course of negotiations another system of activities, designed to achieve consensus within the union and within the company, takes place. Intraorganizational bargaining refers to the system of activities which brings the expectations of principals into alignment with those of the chief negotiator.

The chief negotiators often play important but limited roles in formulating bargaining objectives. On the union side, the local membership exerts considerable influence in determining the nature and strength of aspirations, and the international union may dictate the inclusion of certain goals in the bargaining agenda. On the company side, top management and various staff groups exert their influence on bargaining objectives. In a sense the chief negotiator is the recipient of two sets of demands -- one from across the table and one from his own organization. His dilemma stems from conflict at two levels: differing aspirations about issues and differing expectations about behavior.

Intraorganizational bargaining within the union is particularly interesting. While it is true that for both parties to labor negotiations many individuals not present in negotiations are vitally concerned about what transpires at the bargaining table, the union negotiator is probably subject to more organizational constraints than his company counterpart. The union is a political organization whose representatives are elected to office and in which contract terms must be ratified by an electorate.

Figure 1 illustrates how the four subprocesses relate the union and management bargaining teams which are in conflict. The distributive bargaining, the integrative bargaining and the attitudinal structuring processes directly relate the union and management bargaining teams and the intraorganizational bargaining process relates the bargaining teams to their respective contingencies.


The Relationship of the Subprocesses

The tactics peculiar to each subprocess are basic to the interaction of the four subprocesses. As will be seen, some of the tactics of the individual processes facilitate the interaction of the subprocesses, while others create dilemmas for the bargaining teams.

Integrative and Distributive Subprocesses. In the distributive bargaining process in which fixed resources are being allocated, the basic tactic is to minimize the opponent's information about one's bargaining position while maximizing one's information about the opponent's bargaining without making commitments. On the other hand,

Figure 1

BARGAINING SYSTEM SUBPROCESSES



the integrative process is a problem-solving situation requiring relatively open communications as the parties seek out solutions to and then resolve problems. To develop information for solving problems, subcommittees are often appointed enhancing integrative bargaining. However, if the negotiations have a largely distributive flavor, the parties may not want to indicate the flexibility which the agreement to develop subcommittees conveys (Walton and McKersie, 1965). Additionally, a high degree of trust is necessary for a problem-solving, integrative bargaining approach, whereas in distributive bargaining trust exists "in more limited and subtle ways (p. 182)." Since any bargaining situation involves both issues and problems, the name of the game is to integrate the tactics in such a way as to attain agreement.

Attitudinal Structuring and Distributive Subprocesses. The attitudinal structuring process involves the use of tactics aimed at maintaining or changing the nature of the bargaining relationship. The attitudinal structuring process and the distributive bargaining process are often mutually interfering processes:

A tactic designed to promote a better relationship frequently entails a sacrifice of the substance of distributive bargaining; and conversely a tactic designed to achieve a distributive gain often adversely affects the relationship (p. 270).

Generally, attempts aimed at maintaining or improving a relationship interfere with the tactics of the distributive process. There are situations when the tactics of the two subprocesses are mutually facilitating, but they tend to be extreme situations, e.g., developing minimum levels of trust and acceptance to prevent destructive outcomes.

Integrative and Attitudinal Structuring Subprocesses. The tactics of the integrative and attitudinal structuring processes have few, if any, conflicts.

Before integrative bargaining can take place, the two organizations need to develop a good measure of trust and friendliness. The activities of talking frankly about one's needs, sharing information, jointly formulating solutions, etc. cannot be undertaken unless trust is present. The problem-solving activity serves to improve the relationship even further (p. 279).

Intraorganizational Bargaining and Distributive Subprocesses. In intraorganizational bargaining the negotiating teams are responsible for bringing the expectations of their respective constituencies into line with the realities of bargaining. Keeping constituents from being committed or trying to reduce their commitment to certain preferred bargaining outcomes is a difficult task since the intraorganizational process is so closely linked with the other processes.

Almost by definition the two processes of intra-organizational bargaining and distributive bargaining in conflict. In distributive bargaining the negotiator attempts to modify the opponent's position to meet the expectations of his principals. In internal bargaining the negotiator endeavors to bring the expectations of his principals into alignment with those of the opponent. In this sense, the purposes of these two activities are diametrically opposed. The two processes also frequently interfere with each other at the tactical level.

Distributive bargaining involves tactical attempts to crystallize internal feeling and increase the willingness to fight. These and other steps are helpful in conveying strong commitment and increasing the power position of the party. All these activities conflict with intraorganizational bargaining, in which the negotiator reduces feeling, divests the membership of ambitious objectives, and generally strives to prevent the membership from developing too great an attachment to any particular proposal.

A particularly important limitation is placed on effective distributive bargaining in which the negotiator is unsure of his ability to revise his own organization's position. He is foreclosed, for example, from making a timely concession -- one which might lead to the best overall distributive results -- when his own organization is not yet convinced of the need for a concession (pp. 344-5).

However, the tactics used in the intraorganizational and distributive processes do not always conflict.

For example, by maintaining a firm position (distributive tactic), Opponent can help Party revise the position of his own organization. Similarly, by giving up on an issue very grudgingly and making a big issue over a small point (distributive tactic), Party can help Opponent distort the level of achievement as perceived by Party's organization. In both cases, the distributive tactics of one assisted the other in achieving internal consensus (p. 346).

Intraorganizational Bargaining and Attitudinal Structuring Subprocesses. The relationship between intraorganizational bargaining and attitudinal structuring processes is basic.

The relationship between the two negotiators is sometimes a constraint on the behavior one negotiator might use to comply with the expectations of members of his own organization. At other times, the relationship bond actually enables the negotiator to be more effective in achieving internal consensus (p. 349).

In distributive bargaining particularly, attitudinal structuring plays an important part in accomodating intraorganizational needs to bargaining realities: "...many of the attitudinal structuring tactics involved helping Opponent, sometimes in ways that strengthened his position internally (p. 349)."

Intraorganizational Bargaining and Integrative Subprocesses.
The intraorganizational bargaining and integrative bargaining processes can have positive or negative interactions.

Very often integrative bargaining is impeded by intra-organizational pressures which require the negotiator to act in a specified way. His constituents may not tolerate off-the-record discussion, subcommittees, and the other tactics necessary for integrative bargaining. Nor may the constituents be satisfied with an agreement that had been reached via problem solving (p.350).

On the other hand,

Intraorganizational bargaining aims at developing flexibility in one's position. To the extent that the organization takes a more flexible position, the purposes of integrative bargaining can also be served.

Consider the tactic of bringing the constituents face to face with the realities of the situation. Such a move can serve the purposes of intraorganizational bargaining by forcing the constituents to revise their aspirations and the purposes of integrative bargaining by making available more viewpoints and problem solvers (assuming that their energies are harnessed through subcommittees, etc.).

Even the alternate tactic of isolating the membership serves the same double purpose. Such a move is functional for intraorganizational bargaining in that it prevents them from perceiving the actual level of achievement until it is too late; and it is functional for integrative bargaining in that it removes constraining influences from the bargaining room, thereby allowing the key participants to increase joint achievement through problem solving (p. 351).

Although this brief summary of Walton and McKersie's theory of social negotiations certainly does not do justice to the complex development given in their book, it serves as a useful base for exploring the model's application to the development and implications of the faculty bargaining process.

III. INPUT MODEL -- FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATION OF BARGAINING PROCESS

The task at this point is to relate the structure, processes and behavioral relationships of higher education (the inputs) to the collective bargaining process (the exchange mechanism) in such a way as to explain variations in the operation of the bargaining process. Walton and McKersie's analytical framework of the collective bargaining process, discussed in the previous section, serves as a useful vehicle for developing this relationship.

The emergent collective bargaining system is a product of the internal and external environment in which it evolved, that is, the internal structural and behavioral dimensions of a particular academic institution or system of higher education and the economic and political forces external to a particular institution or system of higher education. It is necessary to place systems of higher education in an external environment because, as one author notes:

An organization is somewhat analogous to a living organism, since it is shaped by the environment in which it is born and nurtured. Just as organizations change, environments change and to ignore the latter is to misunderstand the former (Filley, 1969, p. 81).

The primary inputs to Walton and McKersie's behavioral theory of collective bargaining, of course, are the attitudes and behavior towards the bargaining process of the participants -- the members of the bargaining unit, the members of the management hierarchy and the respective negotiators for these groups. Producing these participant attitudes and behavior towards the bargaining process are forces internal and external to the particular system of higher education where bargaining has originated. The explanatory relationships among the input factors and between the input factors and the bargaining process are quite complex, particularly when a time dimension is considered. For example, while initial faculty militancy is a function of a certain set of forces internal and external to a particular organizational context, subsequent attitudes and behavior towards the bargaining process derive from experiences with both the operation and output of the bargaining process itself. Feedback from the operation of the bargaining process to initial attitudes and behavior begins immediately. The output model to be developed at a later point will deal with the consequences of the bargaining process for higher education and the way in which these consequences feed back to affect ongoing and subsequent negotiations.

The discussion below will first consider the initial internal and external determinants of faculty attitudes and behavior towards bargaining and the impact which these would have on the bargaining

process.¹ Included in this discussion will be an exploration of the determinants and impact of the attitudes and behavior of the faculty organization leadership.

Second, a similar examination will be made of the initial determinants of administrator attitudes and behavior towards the bargaining process and the impact which these would have on the operation of the bargaining process. A third area of discussion will be the impact on participant attitudes and behavior, and consequently, the operation of the bargaining process, brought about by structural and processual aspects of the bargaining process which require the parties to relate to each other in certain ways. The internal and external determinants of these structural factors will also be detailed. Finally, bargaining power, although a dimension of the bargaining process which is implicit throughout the above areas of discussion, will receive coverage in a separate discussion due to its importance to the operation of the process.

Faculty Attitudes and Behavior

The purpose of this section is to develop a model specifying the various factors affecting faculty attitude and behavior towards collective bargaining.² The task is somewhat complex due to the fact that several levels of analysis are involved: the individual; the small group (e.g., a department); the organization (e.g., an institution or system of higher education); and the external environment. However, all of these levels are important in explaining how faculty attitudes and behavior affect the bargaining process and will be incorporated into the discussion below.

It is posited that a faculty member's attitudes and behavior towards collective bargaining are a function of a faculty member's job satisfaction which, in turn, is derived from (1) the interactions dictated by membership within a certain group and the organization of which the group is a component, and (2) the social beliefs of the faculty. To some extent, a faculty's social beliefs are also a product of organization and group variables.

¹The bargaining unit may include more than teaching faculty. However, since the focus of the research is faculty bargaining, the discussion will concentrate on faculty attitudes and behavior. The implications for bargaining of heterogeneous bargaining units are important, nevertheless, and will be discussed in a later section.

²This discussion excludes the impact on faculty attitudes and behavior towards bargaining of structural and processual factors peculiar to the bargaining process. This will be explored in a later section.

It can be expected that faculty attitudes and behavior towards the collective bargaining process as derived from its job satisfaction and social beliefs can condition the outcome of that process in various ways. If faculty attitudes are not fully supportive of the bargaining process, then membership and participation in bargaining activities may not follow. The more difficulty the faculty organization has in achieving consensus among its members towards its goals, the more difficulty it will have in presenting a united bargaining front. For example, faculty from institutions with a degree of self-governance are less likely to accept an employee organization's attempts to intrude on or change this traditional role because the faculty enter the bargaining process with a particular set of expectations concerning its role in academic governance. Internal dissension, whatever its source, may undermine a bargaining agent's strategies, increasing the probability that the bargaining relationship between the faculty bargaining agent and the administration will develop into a high conflict, adversary relationship.

Figure 2 illustrates the posited relationships between faculty job satisfaction, faculty social beliefs, faculty attitudes and behavior towards the bargaining process and the operation of the bargaining process. A behavioral framework developed by Hellriegel, French and Peterson (1970), as "a means of identifying and portraying the assumed relationships among the key variables considered to provide the behavioral framework of teachers vis a vis collective negotiations (p. 381)" was particularly useful for relating faculty satisfaction with its work and faculty social beliefs to faculty attitudes and behavior towards collective bargaining. The discussion below will elaborate on these relationships.


Faculty Satisfaction

It is expected that faculty who express greater dissatisfaction with their working environment will tend to support the normative view that there should be formal participation in faculty collective bargaining, be more satisfied with or express a desire for a greater extent of participation by their bargaining agent in setting their conditions of employment and be more likely to participate in bargaining activities.

What are the dimensions of faculty dissatisfaction which explain differential faculty attitudes and behavior in regard to collective bargaining? Unfortunately, there has been little systematic research examining either faculty job satisfaction or faculty acceptance of the bargaining process. For example, Gustad (1969) recently reported that little is known of the relationship between faculty satisfaction and faculty working conditions. As a consequence, the most useful starting point is a list of satisfaction factors developed by Hellriegel, French and Peterson (1970) from an extensive review of the literature dealing with teacher bargaining in elementary and secondary schools. The ten satisfaction dimensions which they identified were: rapport with principal;

Figure 2

FACULTY ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR AND THE BARGAINING PROCESS



satisfaction with teaching; rapport among teachers; salary; load; curriculum; issues; status; community support of education; school facilities and services; and, community pressures. Hellriegel, French and Peterson (1970) then measured the level of satisfaction of a sample of public school teachers and found that the respondent teachers were relatively satisfied with the role of teaching, while they were somewhat dissatisfied with the status and economic rewards available in the role (the literature is generally consistent with this finding). The results, in descending order of satisfaction were: satisfaction with teaching; community pressures; rapport among teachers; overall satisfaction; teacher load; teacher rapport with principal; community support of education; curriculum issues; school facilities and services; teacher status; and teacher salary.

A review of the limited literature on faculty satisfaction indicates that many of the satisfaction dimensions noted above may be relevant for faculty in institutions of higher education as well (for example, see Gustad, 1969; Balyeat, 1968; and Theophilus, 1967). As a result, faculty support of the bargaining process is expected, in part, to be a function of the following groups of factors: economic benefits; working conditions; decision-making authority in regard to faculty benefits and educational policy; rapport with various levels of administrative leadership; rapport among faculty; public support of education; and faculty independence and freedom in carrying out its duties. It remains for systematic research to expand and weigh these dimensions of satisfaction. Some of the societal and organizational origins of faculty satisfaction are discussed below.

Faculty Social Beliefs

Although job satisfaction can directly influence a faculty member's view of collective bargaining, it is also expected that an individual's social beliefs can act as an intervening variable between the two as well as directly affecting faculty perceptions of collective bargaining (see Figure 2). Since not all of the variance concerning faculty attitudes and behavior toward collective bargaining can be explained in terms of faculty satisfaction, it is postulated that individual differences deriving from experience in the larger society can condition the degree of job satisfaction as well as affect the attitudes and behavior with regard to collective bargaining.

For instance, one might hypothesize that perceived low income on the part of a female teacher may result in dissatisfaction with respect to salary. But if the female in society has been conditioned to assume a more passive and non-aggressive role than the male, there may be a lower propensity for females to support strikes (Hellriegel, et al, 1970, p. 383).

As another example, a faculty's concept of professionalism -- a particular set of ideas concerning the conditions under which work is to be done -- could cause it to become dissatisfied if the work environment did not meet its professional expectations, e.g., lack of autonomy, but at the same time lead it to reject collective bargaining and disdain strikes because of other professional e.g., service and responsibility to the public.

One of the most important conclusions from a study by Corwin (1970), was that school teachers who seemed to be more professionally oriented to their work were more tension ridden. Indeed, professionalism as measured by both attitudes and behavior seemed to entail a certain degree of conflict. In almost every test that Corwin made, as teachers' average professionalism increases, the conflict rates increased accordingly. Sex and average age of a faculty accounted for some of this militancy. But when these were held constant, the relationships between professionalism and conflict remained in faculties having varying terms of tenure.

Corwin (1970) felt that the ideological conflict induced by faculties trying to accommodate simultaneously to the demands of bureaucratization and professionalization would continue to grow. Though his research was conducted early in the movement of school teachers towards unions, he would probably attribute this movement in part to the teachers' desire to achieve professionalism. In the higher education context, the faculties also may be attempting to achieve (two-year institutions) or protect (graduate institutions) professionalism through collective bargaining. But will the desire of faculty in four-year institutions to protect professionalism lead to widespread acceptance of the strike due to its "unprofessional" aspects?

A faculty member's age, job experience, education, previous union exposure (including parents' experiences), and social class as represented by his parents' occupations are other examples of background characteristics which could condition acceptance of the bargaining process. For example, Corwin (1970) found that men are definitely more militant than women, older faculty members are more militant than younger ones, and faculty from social science disciplines are among the most militant in his sample.

Corwin (1970) also found that the most militant and thus the most professional teachers were also the most satisfied, in contrast to the expectations of the model being discussed here that the more dissatisfied faculty would be more likely to support collective bargaining. But why are "professional" teachers more militant? As even Corwin indicated, one reason is that the professional teachers want more autonomy. Thus, it is unlikely that professional, militant faculty would be satisfied with their decision-making authority. Corwin's measure of satisfaction was extremely general, including only three items, thus specified areas of satisfaction could not be correlated with levels of militancy. Until disproven by research results, the model being developed here will specify that faculty job dissatisfaction is determinant of faculty support of the bargaining process.

Organizational and Group Characteristics

While individual differences account for differences in levels of faculty job satisfaction and of faculty acceptance of the bargaining process, organizational and group characteristics are perhaps more important in shaping faculty attitudes and behavior. Indeed, the mix of social beliefs existing within a group or organization are determined, in part, by group and organizational selection criteria and by the socialization process which takes place within a group or organization.

The main thrust of Corwin's (1970) analysis of teacher professionalism and militancy was "away from the characteristics of the people involved in conflict and into a consideration of teachers' roles, their relationships in the system and the content and form of the issues themselves (p. 10)." Corwin's rationale for this direction of analysis, which is applicable to the model being developed here, is that the drive toward organization has more to do with organizational characteristics than individual differences. Theophilus (1967) in his study of faculty job satisfaction found that satisfaction attached by professors to certain potential incentives differed significantly among the several organizational units of the university. In addition, twelve characteristics, such as rank and age, "were found to have comparatively little effect on attitudes, thereby supporting a conclusion that a professor's attitudes of satisfaction in larger measure depended upon the unit to which he belonged. The inference was that the differences among units were: 1) caused by personality types that gravitated toward a certain discipline or field; and/or 2) caused by differences in the environment of the unit itself (administrative policies and practices, leadership, traditions, peer group influence, etc.) (p. 35)."

What are some of the structural and processual characteristics of groups and organizations which affect levels of satisfaction and support of faculty unionism? The factors thought to be particularly relevant to faculty bargaining are: size; organizational stability; the authority structure and the distribution of influence within this structure; supervision; resource availability; methods of salary payment; and, organizational and group socialization-integration processes (Indik and Berrien, 1968).

Size. Institutional size could be a factor contributing to conflict. Studies of collective bargaining in private industry indicate that industrial disputes and work stoppages increase with establishment size, partly, as one author noted, because morale varies inversely with unit size (Tannenbaum, 1965). Corwin (1970) in his study of teachers found that the larger schools in his sample were more militant.

Method of Salary Payment. In institutions with structured salary schedules providing for automatic increments based on seniority and/or merit, unified action is more likely to develop due to common salary problems. In institutions without a structured salary system, a tendency for new faculty and top scholars to receive a large proportion of the wage increases may also lead to discontent and united action.

Stability. A characteristic of two-year colleges and emerging and changing four-year colleges affecting faculty dissatisfaction and faculty acceptance of the bargaining process is the "lack of an academic tradition. Many community colleges were formed virtually overnight, and the faculties were gathered rather suddenly from many quarters ...the organizational structures and the mutual accommodation of diverse faculty members have not had the usual mellowing of years (Jacobs, 1972, p. 67)." Thus, in community colleges and other relatively new institutions, the absence of stabilized relationships and structures can be a source of faculty dissatisfaction. In teachers' colleges undergoing the transformation to a broader curricula, dissatisfaction will occur for opposite reasons, that is, because established structures and relationships are being upset. Faculty in schools faced with a declining enrollment are likely to be concerned about job security.

Resource Availability. Faculty satisfaction with public support of education deals in part with whether it thinks the public and the legislature is providing adequate financial support for what it believes to be an acceptable university program. Additionally, the resources available for faculty benefits could be expected to affect the bargaining process if an institution is unable to meet the bargaining patterns elsewhere. Faculty will experience greater dissatisfaction in institutions that are unable to provide them with the remunerative benefits that other institutions may be offering. However, in private industry, it has been found that harmonious and cooperative relationships are more likely to occur in institutions experiencing economic insecurity. A similar pattern could occur in private schools confronted with economic problems where additional funds can be acquired in the short run only by increasing tuition. However, it is also more likely that students in private schools will be more involved in the collective bargaining process, usually supporting an administration position which attempts to hold the line on tuition increases.

Supervision. Faculty dissatisfaction may arise from its relationships with its administrative hierarchy -- the complex of relationships with its department heads, deans, the central academic administration, and state governing bodies. It is likely that the quality of rapport with the administration will vary according to faculty perception of the relative power and fairness of the administration (Hill and French, 1967).

On-the-Job Socialization -- Integration Processes. Faculty belief systems may vary among institutions and within institutions (e.g., colleges, departments) depending on the rules and practices used in the selection of faculty. This is to say, faculty belief systems are self-selecting characteristics of particular kinds of institutions as these organizations go about selecting and rewarding faculty according to their particular rules and procedures. Universities which emphasize graduate study employ a larger percentage of faculty with doctorates than those which do not. This could mean that it would require a higher level of dissatisfaction for them to overcome educationally acquired concepts of professionalism

which may not include unionism. On the other hand, two-year college faculty members would be more likely to embrace unionism since they generally derive from secondary schools where bargaining has been underway for a longer period of time and because they have low mobility in that they tend to identify and remain with a single institution as do secondary teachers (Jacobs, 1972).

Within an institution, there may be differences in faculty job satisfaction and attitudes towards unionization due to disciplinary orientations. However, the militancy of a discipline may be less closely associated with its professional orientation per se than with its level of prestige within a particular organization; the inconsistency between a department's prestige and its autonomy from the administration may be highly correlated with militancy (Corwin, 1970).

Authority Structure. Faculty satisfaction with its decision-making authority over faculty personnel matters and educational policy is likely to be particularly determinative of its support of faculty unionism. In public institutions, additional layers of authority external to the institution in the form of state-wide governing boards have operated to reduce faculty influence.

Generally, the rules and traditions establishing the level of faculty control vary with the type of institution of higher education. A task force report issued by the American Association of Higher Education reported that: "the case studies indicate that the greatest discontent and most visible tendencies toward unionization are found at the junior college level...there was considerable faculty dissatisfaction over the complete control by the administration of curricula and promotions and the rigid application of rules governing the conduct of professional duties...similar developments have taken place in the new or emerging four-year colleges and universities (Task Force Report, 1967)." In contrast, Barbash (1970) states that in prestigious universities, "professional autonomy and control are embedded in the structure of government (p. 27)."

It could be expected that where faculty governance is well established, collective bargaining would not rapidly intrude on the established mechanisms because the faculty enter the bargaining process with a definite set of expectations concerning its role in academic governance. Indeed, collective bargaining might make traditional modes of faculty governance more responsive and effective in such instances. On the other hand, where there is a non-existing or inoperable system of faculty governance, particularly in two-year colleges and in emerging and changing four-year colleges, it could be expected that the faculty bargaining agent would directly seek to enhance faculty participation via the contract. It should be recognized, of course, that other factors related to the operation of the bargaining system will condition the survival of traditional modes faculty governance. For example, where the collective bargaining relationship is a high-conflict, adversary one, it is more likely that traditional faculty governance will falter in competition with the bargaining process.

External Forces

External forces shape the outcome of bargaining in a particular institution by causing and/or reinforcing faculty dissatisfaction with the institutional environment, by leading to faculty acceptance of the bargaining process, and by shaping the boundaries of the collective bargaining system which develops. Five external factors are identified as determining the outcome of collective negotiations by affecting the above areas: market forces; faculty bargaining experiences at other institutions; legislation; nature of faculty organizations; and, competition among employee organizations (Hellriegel, et al., 1970). Legislation, an external force which primarily shapes the boundaries of a developing collective bargaining system, will be discussed in a later section.

Market Factors. With regard to market forces, forces which primarily reinforce faculty acceptance of the bargaining process, the academic bull market appears to be nearing an end for most disciplines as the rate of enrollment growth slows and as governing bodies, federal and state, reduce financial support. The mobility of dissatisfied faculty will diminish as job opportunities decrease, thus initiating pressures for unified group actions and reinforcing faculty acceptance of collective bargaining on campuses where the formalization of bargaining has occurred. To the extent that the reduction of mobility interferes with the departure of discontented faculty, then organizational tension is likely to increase, possibly leading to group action. Therefore, it would be expected that the diminished mobility of faculty, while not necessarily creating faculty job dissatisfaction, may lead to greater acceptance and support of the bargaining process as a means of ventilating job dissatisfaction.

External Bargaining Experience. Faculty dissatisfaction and faculty acceptance of collective negotiations will come from a knowledge of the economic gains of public school teachers -- gains which have not gone unnoticed by faculty in colleges and universities. particularly in two-year colleges. Furthermore, if the faculty have learned that colleagues in other institutions of higher education have gained rewards, both economic and non-economic, from the collective negotiations process, these favorable faculty experiences in other institutions are likely to increase faculty dissatisfaction and thus faculty acceptance of collective negotiations as a means of fulfilling faculty needs.

Nature of Employee Organization. Initially, the choice of the external faculty bargaining agent is a function of faculty attitudes towards bargaining -- the more militant the faculty, the more militant the bargaining agent. To the extent that the policies and practices of the various organizations seeking to represent faculties are incorporated into local bargaining relationships, it can be expected that the impact of bargaining will vary in accordance with the organization which represents the faculty. For example, it could be expected that senates might atrophy at a slower rate where the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) represents the faculty because of that organization's long-standing objectives of preserving traditional forms of faculty governance. If the AAUP organiza-

tions do follow this strategy, then it would appear that an important issue for the AAUP organizations to resolve would be how they could maintain or increase membership support when many of the gains which the organization could take credit for are being resolved through traditional, non-union procedures. Whether the increased emphasis on collective bargaining recently agreed to at the national AAUP convention will affect the AAUP's traditional role is a much debated, but undecided issue (Brown, 1972).

The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) brings to faculty negotiations the more traditional union view that collective bargaining is an adversary process. As a consequence, an AFT local might be less willing to preserve competing decision-making procedures such as senates, partly because the authority left in the hands of senates would be perceived as diluting the authority and thus the potential political gains of the union. The attitudes of affiliates of the National Education Association (NEA) in regard to traditional governance procedures are more difficult to predict, but they probably would lie somewhere between the AAUP and the AFT.

Union Competition. An attempt by a different faculty organization to unseat the incumbent faculty bargaining agent has an impact on the attitudes and behavior in regard to the bargaining process of both the faculty and its negotiators. To reinforce its support, an incumbent organization may seek political gains by trying to win major benefits for its members. Conversely, much of the energy which could be used in making gains for the faculty might be dissipated by competing organizations in fighting each other. It was primarily for the latter reason that the Legislative Conference at the City University of New York, which represents the full-time faculty, and the United Federation of College Teachers, which represents the part-time teachers, formulated a merger. "We were fighting each other while the total faculty was faced with budget cuts, enlarged enrollments that were far from adequately financed, and threats to tenure, sabbaticals and reasonable work loads and conditions (Zeller, 1972, p. 26)." Although this example represents a situation where the competition did not come from without the organization, the usual threat to a faculty organization would be external.

The implications for a bargaining relationship of inter-union disputes is clear. If an existing organization is threatened by another, then it would be difficult to develop a problem-solving bargaining relationship as the union needs immediate and significant bargaining gains to consolidate and protect its membership support. Of course, if the academic administration prefers to deal with an incumbent organization then it may be less resistant to the organization's demands. In regard to faculty governance, unions competing for faculty support may use the traditional senates as their battlegrounds, making it difficult to work out viable compromises between traditional governance and faculty bargaining. In such circumstances, it would be politically risky for the incumbent organization to delegate issues to other forums for consideration.

Faculty Organization Leadership

While the boundaries to negotiations provided by the policies and practices of the bargaining agent are important in shaping the bargaining process, the personalities and attitudes of the key participants on the bargaining teams are probably more important. Indeed, at one institution some of the officers in the defeated organization were subsequently elected as officers of the victorious organization.

It is posited that the attitudes and behavior of faculty leadership towards collective bargaining is a function of the leadership's job satisfaction and social beliefs and the policies and practices of the external bargaining agent. However, the initial choice of union leadership is in large measure a function of faculty militancy, which in turn is a function of the environment which produced the relationship. "There is a two-way relation between personalities of negotiators and the institutional pattern in which they operate. The individual may influence the relationship, but the existing relationship also may determine the type of person who gets the job (Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 196)".

Research has indicated that several personality characteristics may be important in shaping the nature of the bargaining process. "Certain personality attributes are believed to be associated with more conflictful relationships. Persons are less likely to enter into cooperative relationships if they score high on authoritarianism and dogmatism, have low self-esteem, and are inherently suspicious and nonaccepting (Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 196)".

In the academic context, it might be expected that in institutions of higher education where the faculty have traditionally participated in many management decisions, faculty would be particularly non-responsive to an autocratic union leader. As a consequence, it would be more difficult to achieve consensus within the faculty organization.


Knowledge of and experience with the bargaining process are also important leadership attributes. A loss of experienced leadership can upset the equilibrium which has developed in a particular bargaining relationship (Slichter, et al., 1960). Figure 3 illustrates the relationships between the factors described above and the bargaining process.

Administrator Attitudes and Behavior

Just as the degree of faculty militancy has an impact on the bargaining process, the attitudes and behavior of the administrators towards collective bargaining have a similar effect. The relationship of administration attitudes and behavior and faculty militancy was discussed in a preceding section. In the bargaining context, an administration knowledgeable with the bargaining process is likely to contribute to the creation of a positive bargaining relationship. More often, however, an inexperienced, threatened administration undermines the development of a positive bargaining relationship

Figure 3

FACULTY AND FACULTY NEGOTIATORS' ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR
AND THE BARGAINING PROCESS



by not being familiar with the tactics of the bargaining process. An adversary recognition phase created by uninformed management behavior presents real problems for the development of a positive bargaining relationship in the long run. Further difficulties may be presented where an administration accustomed to its usual decision-making processes has difficulty assigning proper priority to collective bargaining and in considering the implications of its policy planning on the bargaining process.

It is posited that the administrators' attitudes and behavior towards bargaining are the product of the same forces which shape faculty attitudes -- their social beliefs and their satisfaction with various aspects of their organization, particularly the recent changes brought about by economic pressures and increasing external controls. As with the faculty, administration social beliefs may be a function of the type of educational institution in which they are employed. In institutions where there has been a tradition of faculty participation before collective bargaining, or where the administrators have come from such institutions, the social beliefs of the administrators which derive from such experiences may have differing consequences for collective bargaining. On the one hand, if as former faculty members they accept the concept of faculty participation, then the psychology of negotiations may tend to be more of an integrative, problem-solving nature. Conversely, while administrators may recognize faculty claims for participation as legitimate, they may be wont to destroy traditional modes of faculty input, particularly the senates, given their past expectations about the form this participation should take.

Indeed, the administrators from several campuses where bargaining is occurring have indicated that they have been the ones most concerned with preserving traditional procedures, not the faculty organizations. This position is underscored by comments such as the following: We don't feel that the faculty organization adequately represents the views of the faculty -- the Senate does. As a consequence of these feelings, the administration may attempt to shore up traditional senates by giving them greater and broader authority. This lack of desire to recognize the faculty unions as legitimate spokesmen for the faculty could lead to difficult labor-management relationships unless the unions also placed some value on preserving traditional procedures.

Basic to the administration's views of the bargaining process is an understanding of the extent to which the former faculty member who becomes an administrator assumes the supervisory role of the administrative position. In contexts other than higher education, it has been indicated that once an individual moves into a supervisory position, he assumes the behavior which the supervisory role requires (for example, Lieberman, 1956, pp. 385-402). However, there may be differences in the higher education context which would weaken the application of this finding to the educational environment. It has often been said that university administrators view themselves as educators first and administrators second. Many do not have a permanent commitment to administration and most seem to

expect, and do in time, return to the academic ranks. Often the announcement of administration resignations are accompanied by a statement to the effect that the resignation was tendered due to a desire to return to teaching and research. Indeed, many continue to teach and publish after assuming administrative roles. This commitment to staying involved in and returning to non-supervisory roles is certainly atypical of other contexts where returning to non-supervisory positions usually has undesirable effects on status and salary. The dearth of systematic research on institutions of higher education makes it difficult to draw conclusions about how the absence of a permanent commitment by administrators to their supervisory roles affects the management of institutions of higher education, or, for the purposes of this discussion, the operation of the bargaining process. But it seems reasonable to suggest that the continued identification of administrators with the academic life would tend to make them receptive to increased faculty demands for participation, though from their previous faculty experiences they would lean towards preserving traditional governance processes. Professional managers, on the other hand, may see the bargaining process differently. Confronted by a challenge to authority and prerogatives, they would be inclined to conserve or enlarge the scope for managerial decision-making.

The responsibility for balancing the attitudes and behavior of the members of the administrative hierarchy in the negotiating process lies with the administration bargaining team. The attitudes and behavior of the administration negotiators generally reflect those of the administrative group, particularly the top administrators, just as the choice of key faculty negotiators usually reflects the degree of faculty militancy. However, in a new relationship where the key administration negotiators were selected for their knowledge of labor relations, and thus hold different values in regard to the bargaining process, the key negotiators usually have to use intraorganizational bargaining tactics to bring about an awareness among the administrators of the needs of the bargaining process. Even as the bargaining relationship develops the administration negotiators have to balance the desires of the management group against the realities of the bargaining situation. This task is particularly difficult in the public sector where management authority is diffuse, where the social beliefs of the management team about the needs of higher education differ. On the latter point, there may be differences of opinion between college presidents and state-wide governing boards, executive budget officials and the legislature in respect to sabbaticals, teaching loads and class size. Somehow the administration negotiators must develop a common management position out of these basic disagreements.

Structural Aspects of the Bargaining Process

Another group of forces affecting the participants' attitudes and behavior in regard to the bargaining process, which take effect after the process is underway, is comprised of structural aspects of the process which require that the parties must relate to each other in certain ways in the bargaining context. For example, strike activity may be prohibited by legislation. These structural factors

are a product both of the particular organizational structure of an institution or system of higher education and of factors external to this system, particularly legislation. Legislation has extremely important effects on collective bargaining because it establishes access to and shapes the boundaries of a collective bargaining relationship. As a result, it could be expected that variations in legislation between states and between the private and public sectors would cause variations in the types of collective bargaining systems which develop. For example, a legislative factor distinguishing the impact of bargaining between the private and public institutions will be the fact that private institutions are now within the jurisdiction of the long-established, and generally stronger (from labor's view), National Labor Laws.³ Since all private institutions meeting the federal size requirements are subject to the same set of laws, the legislative impact on bargaining will be more uniform than in the public sector where there are major legislative differences between states. Labor legislation can have an effect on all phases of a collective bargaining relationship -- the recognition process, the contract negotiations process and the contract administration (grievance) process. The enactment of legislation establishing rights for employees to organize facilitates the ability of a faculty to gain access to the collective negotiations process, particularly legislation which protects employee rights to engage in union activities and which provides recognition procedures (unit determination and election procedures). It is no coincidence that most of the public institutions in which faculty bargaining has occurred are located in states with labor legislation covering public employees. As one author noted, "legislation which provides the mechanism for establishing a representation system tends to create a presumption that such a system will actually materialize (Garbarino, 1971a p. 6)."

The internal and external factors leading to structural limits on the parties behavior in the bargaining process will be discussed under the topics of bargaining structure (who is involved and how they relate during negotiations) and bargaining scope (the types of issues which are subject to joint decision-making).

Bargaining Structure

One aspect of the recognition process which has particular implications for the negotiating process is the nature of the bargaining structure resulting from the unit determination process. The bargaining structure determines the manner in which the two parties, administration and the faculty organization, relate to each other for bargaining purposes, and is generally a product of factors both

³The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) asserted jurisdiction over private institutions in their relationships with non-academic employees in the Cornell University case (183 NLRB 41). The NLRB extended its jurisdiction to academic employees in the Long Island University case (186 NLRB 153). For a legislative review, see Begin (1973b).

internal and external to a particular system of higher education. Usually, legislatively determined bargaining unit criteria are applied to the complex of rules, regulations and traditions which comprise a system of higher education to determine the bargaining unit. Bargaining structure is important because it can have a major effect on the type of bargaining relationship which develops between the faculty organization and the academic administration. If either party has difficulties in achieving internal consensus in the intraorganizational bargaining process due to the bargaining structure, it would be more difficult for the negotiators to engage in strategies aimed at building a cooperative relationship (attitudinal structuring). Problems in achieving internal consensus arise for the administration when the administration decision-making structure is complex and for the faculty organizations when the bargaining unit has heterogeneous membership due to a broad occupational, functional (type of institution) and geographical bargaining unit composition.

It could be expected that the more diffuse the management authority of an institution, the more difficult it would be for the administration bargaining team to achieve consensus on bargaining matters. In public universities, particularly, the authority to make decisions can be quite diffuse, with the faculty, the central administration, the local and state-wide governing boards, the governor's budget staff and the legislature often having decision-making roles. Most of the examples used by Walton and McKersie (1965, Chapters III, IV) to illustrate intraorganizational bargaining problems applied to the union negotiators because they are drawing on private sector experiences where management authority tends to be less diffuse. However, when the management hierarchy is unable to reach consensus, often because of disagreements over the proper locus of authority, employee organizations, as Commons (1913) pointed out long ago, will seek out the source of power if the management representatives at the bargaining table do not have the authority to reach agreements. A systematic discussion of deviations from the formal bargaining structure brought about by the diffusion of management authority will be included with the output model.

Problems of achieving internal consensus for employee organizations are created by bargaining units with occupational, functional and geographical dispersion. Generally, the more heterogeneous the bargaining unit, the more difficult it will be to achieve organizational consensus within the employee organization in regard to bargaining demands -- intraorganizational bargaining will be more difficult. For example, in units including non-teaching professionals, the non-teaching professionals could not be expected to support the use of bargaining credit to preserve something which does not apply to them -- the traditional faculty governance system. Similar dissonance could occur in units encompassing part-time faculty, department chairmen and graduate students as well as full-time faculty due to the different needs of the various types of employees. The more occupationally heterogeneous units may tend to average out the effects of the more militant factions, for example, graduate students or part-time faculty, but the probability of achieving internal

consensus within such a diverse unit is decreased. Geographical separation of campuses and functional differences between institutions in the same bargaining unit, for example, units containing two-year community colleges, four-year colleges and graduate universities, could also create a bargaining unit encompassing groups with widely varying needs.

It could be expected that a major effect of heterogeneous units will be that occupational and institutional differentials in regard to salaries and benefits among the employees would decrease as these benefits become more equalized across the different types of institutions under centralized control of collective bargaining. For example, Garbarino (1972b), in evaluating early bargaining experiences at several institutions, found that;

the paradox of faculty unionism to date is that the greatest gains have accrued to the teaching faculty on the margin of the core faculty, to the faculty of the institutions in the integrated systems that have been lowest in the academic hierarchy, and to the non-professionals. The core faculty 'haves' have shored up some of their benefits from possible attack, but otherwise have gained the least from bargaining (p. 15).

To the extent that the faculty "haves" resent these intrusions, the bargaining agent can expect more problems with intraorganizational bargaining the next time around. If the intraorganizational process breaks down, then the faculty "haves" may use other means to protect their status. The output model will discuss the consequences of a breakdown in an employee organization's intraorganization bargaining process brought about by the occupationally diffuse bargaining structure.

Scope of Bargaining

The types of issues which enter the bargaining arena depend on: 1) the insistence with which management defends its prerogatives to unilaterally control -- its management rights; 2) the bargaining structure; 3) legislative provisions governing the issues which can be negotiated; and 4) the extent to which the bargaining agent is able to use the grievance process as an alternative to negotiations.

In many institutions of higher education, the management rights question becomes complex since significant rights are already shared by faculty, particularly those related to peer judgment in matters of hiring, promotion and tenure. If previously established faculty governance procedures continue in force, the scope of negotiations is limited. If the bargaining process assumes jurisdiction, the need for the traditional mechanisms is eliminated.

The bargaining structure affects the negotiating process by limiting or broadening the scope of negotiations. If the bargaining unit is too narrow, then meaningful negotiations over a wide range of issues may be impaired if the management negotiator does not have the authority to negotiate. For example, if a bargaining unit is comprised of faculty from one institution in a large system controlled by a central governing board, the scope of negotiations for the single institution is limited if it is unable to deviate from

centrally determined policies. As another example, in the public context, the legislature is both external and internal to the system of higher education. The legislature is external in that it controls rights to access to collective negotiations, and internal in that it provides funds and sets policy. The more the legislature tends to become involved in specific academic policy development, the narrower the scope of negotiations. For example, in New Jersey, the tenure policies for the state college system are set by statute, effectively removing the issue from the bargaining table, except to the extent that the parties mutually or individually lobby for change before the legislature. A similar consequence applies to the hospitalization and pension benefits which are legislatively determined for all New Jersey state employees.

The scope of bargaining can be broadened or limited by legislative definitions of topics on which negotiations are prohibited, permitted, or required. For example, the faculty at Boston State College in Massachusetts were limited by legislation from negotiating economic items. The fact that the negotiations concentrated on incorporating faculty governance procedures into the agreement was believed by the parties to be a result of the restrictions on economic negotiations (Chronicle of Higher Education, April 3, 1971). Legislative definitions of the scope of bargaining can also affect the contract administration process. For example, the New Jersey statute covering public employee bargaining requires a grievance procedure and permits binding arbitration, whereas the Pennsylvania statute requires binding arbitration.

Another legislative determinant of the scope of negotiations is the existence of unfair labor practices in the legislation for enforcing failures to bargain in good faith. It is argued that the absence of such provisions tends to inhibit the ability, and power, of the unions to broaden the scope of negotiations.

The legal prohibition against public employees strikes in most states (only Hawaii, Pennsylvania and Alaska statutes permit public employees the right to strike) tends to affect the bargaining power of the faculty organizations and thus the scope of negotiations since the available legal, procedural levers to settlement are the mediation and/or factfinding procedures usually provided by legislation. The strike prohibition, of course, does not apply to institutions under the jurisdiction of private sector legislation.

Where certain issues are excluded from negotiations by legislation, or by existing procedures for faculty input, then the prospects for a cooperative relationship between the primary negotiators are improved since the exclusion of distributive issues means that many of the issues left to the parties at the table to resolve in negotiations have integrative, problem-solving potential. The Boston State agreement noted above appears to be an example of this type.

However, where the scope of local negotiations is limited by the structure of bargaining, that is, where the level of management authority at the bargaining table is different than that required to reach agreement, the effect may be different. If the bargaining agent finds it necessary to bypass the level of management represented

at the bargaining table, the development of a positive local relationship would be hindered. However, if the parties placed some value on maintaining local autonomy and had an existing friendly relationship, then they might collaborate in order to maximize gains from the state and in order to protect local decision-making prerogatives from state agencies.⁴

In institutions where the administration bargaining team has a greater degree of control over the budget, for example, in private institutions, as well as a greater degree of control over faculty personnel actions, for example, in community colleges, it is less probable that a cooperative relationship would derive from the attempts of the faculty organization to achieve economic gains and decision-making control for its members. Figure 4 relates both the administrator attitudes and behavior and the structural factors to the bargaining process.

Faculty Bargaining Power

A discussion of an emerging bargaining system would be incomplete without considering the question of faculty bargaining power. Bargaining power is a function of all the internal and external factors affecting the bargaining process discussed above and, as such, is a concept which underlies the entire exchange process. Bargaining power is fundamental to the conduct of any bargaining relationship, including a cooperative relationship which uses primarily integrative tactics. For, even though power bargaining is minimized in a cooperative relationship, a certain degree of power is necessary to establish the legitimacy of the parties to a cooperative relationship.

In private industry the essence of bargaining power lies in the ability of one party to inflict strike costs on the other party. This power dimension is largely restricted in the public sector. With the exception of Hawaii, Pennsylvania and Alaska, public employees do not enjoy the right to strike. In those states where there are public employee statutes which provide public employees the right to bargain, without a corresponding right to strike, there are usually statutory impasse procedures (mediation and/or factfinding) for resolving bargaining disputes. Whether these substitute procedures provide public employees with adequate bargaining leverage is a much discussed but undecided issue. However, in the face of broad proscription of the right to strike, public employee groups at all levels of government have used the strike weapon. Even though public employers know that the strike weapon is illegal, the possibility that public employee groups will in particular circumstances resort to its use cannot be ruled out completely. The absence of unfair labor practices requiring the parties to bargain in good faith is also believed to weaken a union's ability to broaden the scope of negotiations.

⁴These possible deviations from the bargaining process will be discussed further in the output model.

Setting aside the legal issue for the time being and assuming from past experience that the strike weapon will be used by some public employee groups, it is useful at this point to discuss the other dimensions which affect the ability of faculty to use the strike weapon to reinforce its bargaining power. The discussion below will consider the strike costs born by the employee organizations and its members, the strike costs born by management and the contextual factors which condition the pattern of strike costs.

Employee and Employee Organization Strike Costs

As Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 31) point out, the strike costs born by employees and their organizations break down into the following areas:

1. Wage losses;
2. Effect on the security of the employee organization through loss of membership and financial resources;
3. Loss of good will with the management officials; and,
4. Damage to the public image of the employee organization.

In regard to the first point, the greatest cost of the work stoppage to any individual is the loss of wages. Since many faculty are well-paid compared to the typical unionized employee, it could be argued that they would be able to withstand strikes for a longer period of time, assuming that their living expenses were not proportionally higher. However, basic to such a position is an assumption that faculty are disposed to engage in job actions. In the four-year schools, and graduate institutions particularly, it may be difficult to convince the faculty to engage in any degree of militancy. At a minimum, the threshold for engaging in job actions is probably much higher for faculty from these types of institutions due to a probable aversion to this type of "unprofessional" behavior. Another factor possibly affecting a faculty's utility to engage in job actions would be the impact of a strike on faculty-student relationships. To the extent that the professional values of the faculty prevent them from initiating and supporting job actions, the bargaining leverage which the faculty negotiators have at hand is reduced. Moreover, faculty negotiators which engage in job actions without the complete support of the membership endanger the stability and security of the employee organization.

Faculty strike activity would also endanger its good will with management, leading to the development of an adversary, polarized relationship. Again, the faculty may be adverse to this potential outcome. The faculty organization's public image is also likely to be endangered because, under most circumstances, it is more likely that public sentiment would be against the efforts of comparatively

well-paid professionals to increase their economic well-being, particularly if the strike is illegal. In sum, since a faculty is likely to consider the economic and non-economic strike costs unacceptable, it will not be particularly motivated to engage in job action. At a minimum, unless the issues at stake are extremely dear to the faculty, the negotiators will have an extremely difficult intraorganizational bargaining task to convince the faculty of the need to strike.

Management Strike Costs

The costs to management of strike activity are the following:

1. Loss of profits;
2. Loss of status with other management officials;
3. Loss of good-will with labor; and,
4. Loss of public image (Walton and McKersie, 1965).

Since most public and private universities are non-profit, the question arises as to what the substitute for the profit measure is in the public sector. In the absence of the profit motive, the primary motive for the public employer is to do a responsible job for the taxpayers. However, in some quarters it is argued that the political leaders will overlook the long-run implications of wage settlements to offset short-run political costs of strikes (Wellington and Winter, 1971). In other words, political leaders will capitulate in the short-run to prevent political costs. However, while a strike might be embarrassing to the administration of a local institution, there would appear to be little or no economic cost and little political cost to state officials who usually must provide additional funds to resolve the strike, unless the local institution can find funds elsewhere in the budget. As indicated above, politicians would probably have little to worry about in respect to adverse public sentiment.

By participating in a strike, the academic administration also stands a chance of losing good-will with the faculty organizations, creating an adversary relationship. It is unlikely that the local campus administrators would see this as a desirable goal, given their training in the concept of collegiality. Strike activities by the faculty on university campuses will also probably reinforce the less than favorable public image of institutions of higher education which have been developing in recent years. Thus the potential loss of further public image to the university is great. In sum, the potential economic and non-economic strike costs born by an academic administration would seem to be a factor in favor of the employee organizations.

Contextual Factors and Strike Costs

There are a number of other factors which affect the pattern of strike costs in any given set of negotiations -- the state of the

economy, the economic and market structure of the institution, the character of the technology, the labor market structure and the collective bargaining structure (Walton and McKersie, 1965).

Depressed economic conditions in a firm often lead to the development of a cooperative relationship as the parties jointly seek survival of the organization. This pattern will probably repeat itself in private institutions of higher education, but in public institutions it may be more difficult for the faculty to accept economy measures imposed by the state legislature. The demand structure of public universities is somewhat complex. The ability of faculty to get benefit increases is dependent not only upon the impact of benefit increases on tuition levels, but also upon the willingness of the legislature and the taxpayer to support rising higher education budgets. In the face of growing legislature disenchantment with universities and increasing competition for the tax dollar from other social needs, continuing taxpayer support of education is not likely to be favorable to faculty bargaining power.

The technology of teaching both enhances and diminishes faculty bargaining power. The school year covers a finite period and a long strike endangers the ability of an institution to carry out its mission and is particularly disastrous to the students. Moreover, during a strike the faculty really are only stopping their teaching duties. Their research efforts, to which many of them assign a higher priority, are able to continue. There is no way that an administration can continue to operate classes during strikes by substituting instructors because the level of expertise in most classes is too high. On the other hand, the technology of teaching in higher education may work against faculty bargaining power. For example, tenure gives a faculty a long-run commitment to a particular institution and there is no real threat that they will find alternate jobs during the strike and not return to work after the strike is over. Indeed, the school year concept makes it difficult in the short-run for professors to find alternate college employment. The tightening of the labor market in higher education in recent years reduces the mobility of the faculty even more.

The collective bargaining structure can also affect the degree of faculty bargaining power. A large state-wide bargaining unit, for example, would tend to increase the power of the faculty organizations since all educational institutions in the state could be shut down. Even in states where the strike is illegal, a strike in a large bargaining unit makes it difficult for the public employer to assess penalties. Coalitions among employee groups may also be used to enhance bargaining power, as will be discussed at a later point.

In sum, although academic administrations would be responsive to a strike's costs, the absence of the right to strike in many public universities, the fact that many faculty are probably not professionally disposed to engage in strike activity and unfavorable contextual factors combine to diminish the bargaining power of the

faculty. As a result, the faculty negotiators may have limited leverage to push for settlement on difficult issues. Perhaps the greatest leverage available to the faculty negotiators will be the willingness of the administration to recognize the legitimacy of faculty participation based upon the professional qualifications of the faculty.

IV. OUTPUT MODEL -- THE IMPACT OF BARGAINING

The effects of collective bargaining on institutions of higher education are conceptualized as the outputs of the bargaining process. The choice of dependent variables is an important one. Ideally, one would seek to delineate and measure the ultimate "outputs" of a given college or university. But the outputs or goals of institutions of higher education are diffuse. They encompass economic and personal goals of students; professional objectives of research faculty; and a variety of social purposes. Economists have derived estimates of private returns to investment in higher education, but to measure the merits of differential returns by college or university or even by a university system involves formidable conceptual and methodological problems. It follows that the attempt to relate given inputs (collective bargaining) to such outputs may be regarded for the present at least as virtually unattainable.

Given the above limitations, the criteria most useful in measuring the impact of collective bargaining on educational institutions are those related to the intermediate goals of such institutions, that is, the "decision, communication, planning, control and organization processes (of the university system) (Hellriegel, et al., 1970, p. 383)," rather than output goals "which, immediately or in the future, are reflected in some product, service, skill, or orientation which will affect society (Gross and Grambach, 1968; p. 13)." Implicit in this approach, to be sure, is the assumption that structure and process variables are in some undefined way related to final outputs.

How are faculty organizations likely to influence the management and operation of institutions of higher education? Basically, employees, through their bargaining agent, seek to share in making the decisions which govern their employment relationships for the sake of improving their wages and other conditions of employment. Slichter, Healy and Livernash (1960) summarize the literature on the impact of unions in the private sector quite effectively by pointing out that this joint decision-making process has had three general affects on private industrial organizations: "(1) the narrowing of the scope of management discretion; (2) the development of management by policy; (3) the introduction of important changes in management structure (p. 953)." Employee organizations have possible economic effects as well, particularly through the development of systematic wage structures.

It is likely that faculty bargaining will bring about similar changes in educational institutions. However, institutions of higher education have unique structural and processual characteristics which will tend to make the effects of the interaction between the collective bargaining process and higher education complex. For example, in many institutions decision-making authority is decentralized to deans, department chairmen, and the faculty. Other unique aspects of institutions of higher education include the human

relationship between the producer and the product and the ambiguous dual role of department chairmen. These unique characteristics of higher education and their interaction with the bargaining process will be detailed below.

Generally, it is expected that the faculty bargaining process in institutions of higher education will lead to:

1. a rationalization of management practices;
2. a redistribution of authority;
3. changes in the psychological climate; and
4. changes in the resource allocation process.

Each of these four areas of possible impact will be discussed and related below.

Rationalization of Management Practices

If experiences from the private sector are a guide, it can be expected that management decision-making within an institution with regard to personnel policy will be rationalized. Typically, the standardization of management practices results from the efforts of employee organizations to negotiate in a bargaining agreement and to enforce through a grievance procedure objective, uniform employment practices for its members.

It is expected that faculty organizations will promote rationalized management policy, particularly personnel policy, by negotiating (1) more systematic promotion, tenure, reappointment and dismissal procedures, (2) more systematic methods of determining individual salaries, and (3) more systematic procedures for handling faculty complaints. The impetus towards systematic procedures is derived, in part, from the desire of employee organizations to mollify employee complaints concerning management favoritism in regard to personnel decisions. As a consequence unions tend to oppose merit systems and to favor criteria based on seniority.

Collective bargaining not only tends to rationalize the types of decisions which are made, but also the way in which management makes its decisions. Management actions are under continuous monitoring by the bargaining agent, probably a much more attentive form of observation than senates usually tend to provide since the union leaders are probably motivated to a greater extent by the need to increase or maintain constituent support. As a result, management must anticipate the impact and more carefully substantiate the basis of its policy decisions. "Whether the union influence is weak or strong, it always tends to force management to consider the probable consequences of its proposed decisions and to adjust those decisions accordingly (Slichter, et al., 1960, p. 952)." To seek broader policy input, management often begins to consult informally with

employee organizations during the policy development phase on matters it feels are outside the sphere of bargaining. Within the management structure, management must compromise, by developing policy, the competing interests within an organization between employee relations policies, e.g., those relating to students, building programs, or efforts to optimize the efficiency of educational programs (Slichter, et al., 1960).

It should be noted that many rules changes for which the collective bargaining process bears some responsibility may not appear in the contract. These extra-contractual rules changes often derive from bargaining activity outside of the primary bargaining process, which was described in Chapter II.¹ The informal consultation process described above is one example. This informal consultation process and other forms of "alternate" bargaining activity will be detailed in a later section.

The rules changes which result from collective bargaining do not have a rationalizing effect unless they are consistently applied and enforced. The bargaining agent ensures the consistent application of the rules changes by negotiating "due process" mechanisms. In private industry, the establishment of effective procedures for resolving grievances has been one of the most important contributions that collective bargaining has made to union-management accommodation. The right granted a union member to have his grievance heard and dealt with by high level managers and ultimately by outside arbitrators represented such a significant extension of his job rights that it led Benjamin Aaron (1971) to describe "this system of industrial jurisprudence, considered as a whole, as one of the greatest achievements of our society (p. 55)." Slichter, et al. (1960) noted that grievance procedures are considered to be the heart of union-management contracts because their effectiveness determines in large measure how well the terms of the contract are observed. "Adjustment between the parties moves forward, or fails to progress, both at the level of negotiation and in contract administration (p. 738)." While complaint procedures have often been available to faculty before collective bargaining, the evidence suggests that they have been used infrequently. Indeed, one of the primary avenues available to faculty was the AAUP which was external in nature.

The contract administration process contributes to the rationalization process by enforcing the application of rules changes developing from the bargaining process and, where permitted by the scope

¹The primary bargaining process is defined as the negotiations which take place between the faculty and management negotiating teams at the bargaining table and the intraorganizational bargaining which occurs between the faculty negotiators and the members of the bargaining unit and between the management negotiators and other levels of management not represented at the bargaining table.

of the grievance procedure, existing non-contractual university rules and regulations. The effect of this process is to enforce the uniform application of all the rules and regulations covered by the grievance process. The feedback line in Figure 5 from Rules Enforcement to Rules Application illustrates this effect.

The negotiated faculty grievance mechanisms are expected to be a major way by which faculty bargaining will bring about changes in practices at the departmental or school level, particularly the peer judgment process. In institutions where faculty peer judgment is established by regulation and/or by tradition, the grievance procedures will bring about uniform use and application of the peer judgment process across departments and schools. The threat of external departmental review provided in the collective bargaining context where the bargaining agent is aggressively pressing grievances may lead faculty, after experience with the grievance process, to more carefully justify its decisions.


Not everyone agrees that the tendency of unions to develop and enforce policies which treat all employees alike have a place in the academic environment. It is for this reason that statements like the following are made by those familiar with private sector bargaining experiences:

The product of these forces (the need of union leadership to appeal to the masses to retain support) might be expected to be a collective bargaining agreement containing standardized salaries, annual mandated increments, relaxed standards for tenure and promotion with primary reliance upon time service -- in short, a surrender of the environment of excellence, of tough-minded application of high standards through the traditional joint agencies of faculty and administrator (Oberer, 1969, p. 143).

However, to the extent that systematic procedures reduce the number of questionable peer decisions, then it would appear that the operation of the peer judgment process has been refined and improved, though in the short run faculty anxiety is likely to rise until the faculty adjust to the requirements of the procedures that systematic, objective evidence be presented to back up decisions.

A discussion of the grievance process would be incomplete without considering the relationship between the grievance process and the context in which it operates. In essence, there is a two-way relationship between the grievance process and the context. An ineffectively operating grievance system may not only reflect a poor bargaining relationship, but it will reinforce a poor bargaining relationship. It could be expected that the less cooperative the relationship the greater the chance the parties will use power or legal mechanisms to resolve grievances. The grievance process also has implications for the distribution of power which will be discussed in the following section.

Figure 5

RULES APPLICATION AND
ENFORCEMENT PROCESS

Redistribution of Authority

It is expected that as a consequence of faculty bargaining, authority in institutions of higher education will be redistributed: (1) between the faculty and administration; (2) within the faculty; and, (3) within the administrative hierarchy. The relationships between the redistribution of authority, the primary and alternate bargaining processes and the other impacts of faculty bargaining, as indicated in Figure 6, will be incorporated into the discussion below.

Faculty vs. Administration

As in other types of union-management negotiations, it is expected that faculty negotiations will provide the faculty with a stronger voice vis-a-vis both the local administration, and in public institutions, the state regulatory agencies. Management discretion is narrowed by the negotiated contract which requires that management follow consistent rules for personnel actions and job requirements. In the private sector, the scope of negotiations has expanded to encompass an ever increasing range of management policies and practices. When the fact that the faculty enters collective bargaining from a base which entails a certain degree of professional participation is coupled with a bargaining agent's need for political gain, the scope of bargaining in higher education could be quite broad (Perry and Wildman, 1970).

Management discretion is limited only to the extent that the rules changes are applied and/or enforced through the contract administration process. A contract provision which is not applied because of management and/or union oversight does not limit management activity. Thus, the contract administration process affects the distribution of power within an organization by providing for consistent enforcement of rules and regulations. Management authority is limited by the grievance process particularly where binding arbitration comprises the final step. "Agreement to arbitrate means that management must be prepared to submit many decisions to the judgment of neutrals and to abide by the results. Arbitration also means that companies may find their discretion limited by their own past practices (Slichter, et al., 1970, p. 950)." Authority is also redistributed through the grievance process to the extent that faculty bargaining agents are successful in using the grievance process to achieve gains unattainable through the bargaining process (alternate bargaining).

However, the grievance process may also impinge on traditional faculty areas of primary authority.

Although faculty bargaining groups may have no intention of altering the traditional path to faculty membership and promotion, events may logically and inevitably move them in that direction. For the processing of a grievance which claims an unfair or erroneous decision at the departmental level places a higher

administrative authority in the position of automatically defending a departmental decision on grounds of faculty responsibility, or of upsetting it and thus nibbling away at the principle of faculty control. To avoid this problem of adjudication administrators will at least seek to enforce more uniform adherence to rules governing the timing of decisions on faculty status at the department level and insist on clarity in understanding of the conditions of appointment and reappointment (Chernick, 1972, p. 4, 5).

Thus, faculties, in their management role, will be held more accountable for the extent to which peer decisions with respect to hiring, promotion and tenure adhere to the institution-wide procedures, particularly through the external review of their decisions provided by the grievance process. As a body of precedent builds, decision-making flexibility is decreased as the faculty and administration must produce evidence to meet the developing criteria for determining whether or not a person was justly denied promotion or tenure. One effect of this reduced flexibility often voiced by administrators is that the legalized grievance process would reduce their ability to reach an informal resolution of faculty complaints, for example, by placing a faculty member denied tenure in another department. It is believed that the grievance process requires a yes or no decision and eliminates opportunities for compromises. It is unlikely that experienced bargaining agents would agree, since informal settlements usually receive a high priority.

The degree to which faculty authority is subjected to increased external review through the grievance process will depend, in part, on the scope of the grievance procedure. An examination of early agreements from four-year institutions indicates that most of them restrict grievances to procedural rather than substantive matters of academic judgment.

Faculty vs. Faculty

The redistribution of authority within institutions of higher education will occur not only between the faculty and the administration, but within the faculty body as well. A stronger voice may be acquired by faculty traditionally excluded from participation in decision-making by their increased involvement in established procedures and/or by the shift to procedures governed by the collective bargaining contract.

Change in Type of Faculty Participating. It might be expected that young, non-tenured faculty, women and minority faculty, and non-faculty groups, where the latter are included in the bargaining unit, will seek a stronger voice in university governance through faculty bargaining.

Young faculty bearing the brunt of the worsening financial climate in higher education may be particularly active in seeking job protection through a bargaining agent. It is probable that on

many campuses the collective bargaining process will be used as a channel by which women and minorities will seek to eliminate discrimination. While external channels are available through governmental administrative agencies and courts, the collective bargaining process could provide a faster and more immediate means of putting pressure on institutions of higher education to provide equal treatment.

One commentator feels there ~~may~~ be a quality shift:

Not all faculty members will belong to the bargaining agency or participate in its affairs. Those eschewing it may include eminent members of the faculty who object for reasons of principle, lack of time, or both. Elements of the faculty, dissident from the traditional modes of faculty representation because of their own mediocrity and lack of advancement thereunder, may seize upon this ~~alternative~~ as an ersatz avenue to academic 'success' (Oberer, 1969, p. 143).

The importance of faculty characteristics on redistribution of power would appear to depend on the distribution of leadership of the employee organization. As indicated in a previous discussion, leadership in turn is usually a function of the source of support for unionization. To the extent that the faculty bargaining movement on a particular campus derives from the senior, tenured, male faculty, the redistribution of influence to different types of faculty is likely to be minimized. The occupational scope of the bargaining unit is also determinative of the extent to which authority is redistributed among the faculty and non-faculty employees (see Alternate Bargaining below).

The contract administration process may also affect the distribution of authority within the faculty. For example, the fact that many grievances may be against a faculty member's peers for having been denied reappointment, tenure or promotion raises some interesting questions for both the bargaining agent and the administration. What role should the bargaining agent take when the grievance is filed against other members of the bargaining unit? What stance should the university administration take when a grievance is filed against faculty when they are performing their managerial roles, particularly if they are sued in court by the grievant? The level at which grievances are settled may also be affected whether or not the decision being grieved was initially made by the grievant's peers. If the peers made the adverse decision, then it is unlikely that resolution would occur at the first step, unless they are willing to reverse themselves. Additionally if a peer decision was reversed at a higher level, for example, by a dean, then the faculty will be unable to reverse that decision and the grievance will have to move to that level.

The inclusion in the bargaining unit of department chairmen who have effective power to make recommendations concerning faculty personnel matters raises some difficult questions in respect to the

contract administration process. What sort of internal political problems will be presented to the faculty bargaining agent in processing grievances? For instance, does the faculty organization represent the grievant and ignore the interests of the chairman who perhaps made the decisions? As indicated above, the same dilemma arises when a faculty member grieves against a decision made by his faculty peers serving on an appointment and promotions committee. It is not clear, therefore, that the problems for the faculty organization will be much more difficult than in situations where a faculty peer decision has been challenged by the affected faculty member.

Furthermore, will a department chairman be as likely not to recommend the reappointment or tenuring of a faculty member, since such a decision may result in grievances being filed by his bargaining unit colleagues? One consequence of such a reluctance might be that mediocre faculty would be recommended for reappointment or tenure since the existence of a formal procedure and an organization to support the grievant strengthens his relative power.

It is also possible that the product of higher education, the student, will play a greater role in the processing of faculty complaints, particularly if a popular teacher has been denied tenure or reappointment. Students were less able to play a role in the essentially informal procedures used previously.

Changes in Methods of Faculty Participation. At a minimum, faculty organizations will seek representation and participation in existing committees and other governance structures to provide them with continuing input into the governance process. But one of the most common generalizations concerning the impact of faculty bargaining is that traditional modes of faculty participation -- the senate, the committee structures, peer judgments -- will deteriorate in competition with the collective bargaining process. It is at this point that the distinction between faculty bargaining and other types becomes apparent. Authority on many matters has also been delegated to the faculty through senates and an elaborate network of committees. Moreover, peer judgment often plays an important part in decisions involving hiring, promotions and the granting of tenure. In the typical private sector bargaining relationship in the United States, management and unions generally have different areas of primary concern -- management is primarily concerned about producing and marketing a service or product, while unions are primarily concerned not with the shape or color of the product, but with the conditions of employment under which the product is made.

This division of primary concern has not been as true of many institutions of higher education where the faculty, based on professional qualifications, have claimed a role in the development of educational policies. In other words, participative management has been the practice of many institutions of higher education, particularly four-year and graduate institutions. However, a task force of the American Association of Higher Education felt that one traditional means of faculty participation, the senates, would 'atrophy' in competition with external bargaining agents (Task Force

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labor policies that are applied in all its plants (p. 953). "Centralization occurs as a result of the way decisions are made in the negotiation and administration of agreements. The specialized knowledge required to negotiate and administer agreements stimulates the development of centralized industrial relations staff. As discussed previously, the contract administration process is an important part of the rationalization and centralization effects of unions.

One of the unique aspects of many institutions of higher education is the extent to which management decision-making authority is decentralized to subunits of the institution (departments and schools). One effect of the centralization deriving from the bargaining process would be to undermine the current prerogatives of deans and department heads since much pre-bargaining policy design and implementation tends to be localized in departments and colleges. Department chairmen and deans will be required to follow more formal guidelines in reaching their decisions and the scope for independent judgment is likely to be constricted. It probably would not be incorrect to say that many central administrators would view this outcome favorably. As pointed out by many students of faculty governance, the decentralized nature of academic decision-making has inhibited the ability of central administrators to achieve consensus towards desired university-wide goals (Corson, 1960). Thus collective bargaining, by enhancing the control of the central administration over subunits of the institution, may make educational institutions more manageable.

Department Chairmen. Another unique characteristic of most institutions of higher education is that department chairmen have had a rather ambiguous dual role. There has been a debate of long-standing over whether department chairmen, who are often elected, are chosen primarily to protect the interests of their faculty colleagues (like shop stewards) or to provide front-line supervisors accountable to the administration (for example, see Brann and Emmet, 1972). The performance of both faculty and managerial functions by department chairmen is in sharp contrast to front-line supervisors in other organizations. In other organizations front-line supervisors are often forbidden in the contract to do the work of those they supervise; moreover, in the private sector and in most public jurisdictions they are never in the bargaining unit.

It is likely that the unique boundary role occupied by department chairmen will be clarified by the faculty bargaining process. The clarification of the role of department chairmen occurs in part in the decision as to whether or not to include department chairmen in the bargaining unit. Generally, department chairmen are excluded from the unit if their supervisory duties dominate, that is, they have the authority to effectively make recommendations concerning hiring, promotions, reappointments and other personnel actions. Department chairmen found to have such authority usually are administrative appointees, rather than chairmen elected by their peers with a pro forma evaluation at a higher level.

It is difficult to predict the effect of bargaining on department chairmen who start out having a predominantly faculty role and who are included in the bargaining unit, but the long-run effect in most institutions will probably be in the direction of a firmer managerial role. The centralization of authority away from the departmental level under bargaining and the desire of both department chairmen and the faculty that the department chairmen maintain strong faculty ties may reinforce a predominantly faculty role.

On the other hand, the increasing need under bargaining to adhere to institution-wide policies makes department chairmen more accountable to the central administration. Systematic policies deriving from the bargaining process will cause middle management to lose freedom in exercising judgment in areas such as staffing, assignment and other personnel and educational matters. However, department chairmen will be required to uniformly apply these new policies, or be faced with the external review of their decisions which results from having been grieved by the faculty organization. Acting as an advocate in the grievance process is also likely to widen the gap between department chairman and their colleagues.

Other forces working on the side of efficiency may also tend in the next few years to clarify the traditional dual role of department chairmen, especially increasing demands by state governing boards to rationalize the expenditure of educational dollars. Slowing and declining enrollments may also thrust department chairmen into a stronger management role.

Other Levels of Administration. It is also likely that faculty bargaining will reinforce a long-run shift of authority from local governing boards to central campus administrators noted by Jencks and Riesman (1969) to the extent that agreements are primarily negotiated by administrators rather than board members. Moreover, the increased emphasis and priority which will have to be given to industrial relations problems in contrast to the other management problems confronting the university may lead to a redistribution of authority within the central campus administration. Many policy decisions will now have to be shared with those holding industrial relations responsibilities (Slichter, et al., 1960, p. 952).

Authority in public institutions of higher education where state-wide governing boards, state budget agencies and legislatures are incorporated into the decision-making process is quite diffuse. Thus in public institutions, it is possible that in attempting to shift power to themselves, the faculty may reinforce a relatively recent shift of power from local institutions to state-wide governing institutions, a shift which many believe partly explains the origins of faculty unions. The administrators on a local campus will lose prerogatives as state agencies (such as state-wide governing boards or a governor's collective bargaining staff) become involved through the bargaining process and contract administration process with issues previously under local control. Thus, decision-making could be centralized beyond the local campus. At the state level, levels of state government external to the educational

bureaucracy (state labor staff, budget staff, legislature) may be provided increased participation in educational affairs through the bargaining process. The discussion of the alternate bargaining processes below will illustrate the way in which the bargaining process can lead to centralization within the management hierarchy.

Changes in Psychological Climate

It could be expected that the psychological climate of institutions of higher education will be altered as a consequence of the organizational stresses and strains resulting from the rationalization of policies and redistribution of authority under collective bargaining. Indeed, many observers feel that the reforging of faculty-administration relationships brought about by bargaining will have largely unfavorable consequences for the psychological climate of institutions of higher education. As indicated in Figure 6, the psychological climate is a product of all the interactions occurring in the policy development and policy administration aspects of the bargaining process.

For the purposes of assessing the impact of collective bargaining, the psychological climate is defined as consisting of the following sets of relationships: Faculty -- Faculty; Faculty -- Administration; Faculty -- Student; Administration -- Student; Administration -- Administration; and, Faculty -- Non-Faculty relationships.

It is probable that relations among faculty will be adversely affected to the extent that certain groups of employees perceive they are being treated differentially in the contract. For example, does the junior faculty feel that the negotiated package favors the senior faculty, or does the faculty feel that the non-faculty members of the bargaining team receive better treatment? Additionally, certain faculty may be unhappy because the negotiated rules changes interfere with previously existing authority in hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions. For example, a bad climate may develop within a department which has to accept a colleague who has successfully challenged an adverse peer decision through the grievance process. On the other hand, in the long run, improved relationships among the faculty and an increased awareness of university problems by the faculty may result from the increased contact and communications among colleagues from other departments and colleges brought about by bargaining activities. It is possible that anxieties concerning requirements for promotion and tenure will be reduced as consistent procedures and criteria are developed from the negotiations and contract administration processes.

In regard to faculty-administration relationships, many individuals and groups preferring internal governing mechanisms see the university as a community of self-governing scholars in which both faculty and administrators share the same general educational goals. Thus, collective bargaining is opposed because it is felt that unionism presumes an adversary, polarized, employer-employee relationship. If such a relationship does develop, then it is feared

that in time the recruitment of administrators from the faculty may become difficult. Whether such a relationship develops will probably depend in large measure on the nature of the bargaining relationship. An adverse relationship is more likely to polarize faculty-administration relations at all levels of an institution.

A unique characteristic of institutions like colleges, welfare agencies and prisons is that the relationship between the producer and the product is a human relationship. As a consequence, changes in the faculty-administration relationship brought about by collective bargaining may affect the faculty-student relationship, particularly if the students perceive that increased faculty benefits will be at their expense. An issue which is distributive between faculty and student needs, economic or otherwise, may fit this category. This sort of competition is particularly likely to exist where the graduate students are in the same or different bargaining unit. Alternatively, the integrative potential of some issues may improve faculty-student relations, for example, reduced class size helps both groups. Students may become more militant in seeking greater participation to ensure that their interests are protected in competition with bargaining, thus reinforcing a trend in recent years towards greater student participation in university governance. In private schools where tuition increases tend to be more directly related to faculty salary increases, students would be more likely to oppose faculty increases and support the administration, in public institutions, this link is more difficult to perceive. At Rutgers University, for example, though the students were extremely vocal against a proposed tuition increase, they apparently have not tried to link the increase to increases in faculty benefits.

Administration-student relationships will likely be the inverse of the faculty-student relationships which develop under collective bargaining. If the students view faculty gains as their loss, they are likely to be supportive of administration positions. Where graduate students are represented by a bargaining agent, the relationship between the graduate students and the administration will be directly related to the nature of their bargaining relationship. Relations may be better where the graduate students are included in the same unit as the faculty since many of the possible administration-student differences will be mediated by the intraorganizational bargaining process within the bargaining unit.

Relationships within the administrative hierarchy may also be affected by the bargaining process. Administrators at lower levels (department chairmen and deans) may resent the centralization of authority which occurs in both the policy development and policy administration areas under collective bargaining. It is possible that feelings of being left out of the decision-making process could cause widespread resentment and disenchantment, perhaps leading to higher turnover and some difficulty in recruiting administrators from faculty ranks. These feelings could also have an important effect on the bargaining relationship if the contract is undermined due to middle management's lack of commitment to the policies contained within the contract. The bargaining process could affect relationships at other levels of administration if competition develops

between industrial relations specialists and other academic managers, or if already strained relationships between an institution and state regulatory agencies are further stressed under collective bargaining.

Relationships between the faculty and other groups of employees (for example, secretaries, custodial staff or guards) may be cooperative on some issues, perhaps leading to formation of coalitions among bargaining units, or competitive if an issue is distributive between faculty and non-faculty needs.

Allocation of Resources

Another likely result of the rationalization of policy and the redistribution of authority under collective bargaining (see Figure 6) will be a reallocation of resources. In a power context, management must compromise the competing interests within an organization between benefits for the faculty and other resource requirements such as student needs, building programs and benefits for other employees. To the extent that faculty bargaining units are successful in achieving improved economic benefits, resources may have to be reallocated from other potential uses within the institution unless tuition and/or state aid is increased. In other words, the amount of money available for faculty benefits may not only increase absolutely, but also relatively unless additional outside funds become available to fund all competing needs. If increased funds are not available, a faculty at some point may have to consider whether it needs a better pension system or more library books and secretarial help.

The resources earmarked for salary funds may also experience a relative redistribution due to collective bargaining policies. For example, a highly structured, automatic salary distribution system may in time eliminate differentials created by market factors. It is also probable that non-faculty members of the bargaining unit may gain relatively greater benefits than the faculty, as pointed out in an earlier discussion. In general, to the extent that bargaining gains equal benefits for everyone, traditional economic differentials will diminish within institutions (for example, by sex, rank, type of employee, departments or other subunit), between different types of public educational institutions in the same state (two-year versus four-year versus graduate institutions) or between educational institutions and non-educational institutions (for example, a prison system or highway department). There may be similar effects in regard to non-salary items. For example, teaching assistants may be allocated to departments or institutions in a more systematic way as a consequence of bargaining.

The bargaining process may affect the resource allocation process in another way, that is, by slowing down attempts of administrative officials to incorporate change. In the private sector, unions have slowed down change by negotiating restrictive work rules or policies aimed at alleviating the problems of employee displacement. Educational institutions in these days of financial stringency may find faculty organizations impeding what the administration perceives to be the most efficient allocation of resources.

Alternate Bargaining Process

The term "alternate bargaining" refers to the various types of bargaining activities occurring outside of the primary bargaining process. As previously defined, the primary bargaining process includes the negotiations between the employee and management bargaining agents at the bargaining table and the intraorganizational bargaining which occurs between the union negotiators and the members of the bargaining unit and between the management negotiators and other management levels not represented at the table.

Alternate bargaining may take a number of forms. First, when some issues are tacitly or explicitly non-negotiable, the bargaining agent nevertheless will often have input to policy making through a consultation procedure. Second, factional disputes within the bargaining unit unresolved by the intraorganizational bargaining process may cause issues of concern to a particular group to be handled informally. Third, factional disputes within the management hierarchy created by diffuse authority and varying management values may allow bargaining to occur at several levels of management as the bargaining agent seeks out that level most sympathetic to its views. Fourth, alternate bargaining may also occur when a level of management is the common employer of a number of different bargaining units which form coalitions against that level of management. Finally, alternate bargaining may occur during the contract administration phase as the parties work out procedures to apply the contract or as the bargaining agent achieves additional benefits through the grievance route by virtue of favorable grievance decisions. As will be pointed out in the following discussion, each type of alternate bargaining is derived from some aspect of the primary bargaining process, that is, alternate bargaining is an output of the primary bargaining activities. Figure 7 illustrates this relationship.


Issues Concerning Negotiability

In any bargaining relationship, disputes over negotiability are likely to arise, and in the educational context many of the disputed issues will fall into the area of educational policy. The procedures agreed to by the bargaining agent and the administration for providing faculty (or bargaining agent) input on a wide range of policy questions are important. A unique characteristic of many institutions of higher education is the extent to which faculty consultation is sought on policy questions, usually in the form of senates and an elaborate network of committees. Thus, when collective bargaining develops in these institutions, a new decision-making procedure is imposed on existing procedures for faculty input to policy determination. Of course, one of the most common generalizations concerning the impact of faculty bargaining is that the traditional modes of faculty participation will deteriorate in competition with the collective bargaining process.

If the traditional union model for decision-making is followed, on issues which the administration considered to be non-negotiable, formal or informal consulting procedures may be set up to provide

Figure 7

FORMS OF ALTERNATE BARGAINING



the bargaining agent with input on these issues. The key point is that the bargaining agent would be the sole conduit for faculty input on all issues, thus undermining any existing procedures for faculty input. It is this model to which many allude when they say that faculty collective bargaining is incongruous with the characteristics of institutions of higher education.

However, there are two other decision-making models which would preserve traditional faculty consultation procedures. The "constitutional" model would establish or protect traditional mechanisms by incorporating them into the bargaining agreement (Garbarino, 1972a). In this model the bargaining agent would agree to delegate most of its consultation activities to other bodies, but it protects this transfer of authority by giving contractual status to the other decision-making forums. Substantive decisions on salary and related matters would be made in the traditional union pattern and incorporated into an agreement, while a "procedural agreement" is made to codify procedures for making input on other kinds of decisions, usually those dealing with educational policy. The epitome of the constitutional model is probably represented by the Boston State and Worcester State College agreements where the agreements set up a governance system where none had existed before.

A second model, the "informal model" differs from the constitutional model primarily in the way in which the traditional governance procedures are related to the bargaining process (Begin, 1973a). Here there are no formal, contractual relationships between the two systems of governance, but there is informal agreement among the parties at the table, or it is only broadly alluded to in the agreement, that the traditional procedures will be preserved. The relationship between the processes has not been formalized primarily because the faculty at the institutions will not support any tampering with established, traditional procedures. Rutgers University and Central Michigan University primarily fit this model.

To the extent that the constitutional and informal models develop and stabilize, then collective bargaining and traditional governance procedures have been molded together. However, a number of factors operate to make such an amalgam unstable, particularly the informal model. First of all, the bargaining agent, as the exclusive representative of the faculty, has a monopoly on representing faculty interests. Referring issues to other forums is a complicated and somewhat risky business for the faculty organization because there is no guarantee that a senate which might contain different constituencies (faculty not supporting bargaining, administrators not involved in bargaining, competing union organizations and students) will produce the desired outcome. Rules changes which result from the consultation process usually would be excluded from the contract and may not be subject to the grievance procedure. Nor would the bargaining agent get full political credit. As a consequence, a faculty organization may be reluctant to delegate its consultation activities to another body.

Another major problem in working out a compromise between the two systems of faculty participation is confronted when an attempt is made to differentiate between negotiable issues and issues to be left to traditional means of faculty deliberation. Brown (1965) describes the difficulty as follows:

First, the matter of salaries is linked to the matter of workload, workload is then related directly to class size, class size to range of offerings, and range of offerings to curricular policy. Dispute over class size may also lead to bargaining over admission policies (p. 376).

Moreover, early in a bargaining relationship it is usually difficult to separate the negotiable from the non-negotiable issues since both parties to the negotiations are less willing to explicitly admit to the negotiability or non-negotiability of many issues. Disputes over the forum in which issues are to be considered are what may make the constitutional and informal models unstable over the long run.

The type of bargaining relationship which develops in a given academic environment is also extremely important in shaping the fate of traditional faculty governance. As Walton and McKersie (1965) point out:

A general proposition about how the agenda and outcomes of bargaining may be influenced by the relationship pattern in labor relations is that as parties move from the competitive end to the cooperative end of the relationship spectrum, they tend to increasingly confine distributive bargaining (resource allocation) to the areas of inherent conflict, e.g., economic items, and to expand the number of areas in which integrative bargaining (problem-solving) occurs (p. 203).

In the faculty bargaining context, it would appear that the problem-solving exchange of a cooperative relationship would be an important prerequisite to a compromise between traditional modes of faculty governance and the collective bargaining process. A high conflict, adversary relationship is certain to interfere with efforts to preserve traditional faculty inputs because the "number of matters" with which the parties deal informally "in active consultation" outside the contract will most likely be affected by the bargaining relationship (Walton and McKersie, 1965).

Other factors are also important. The existence of competing employee organizations may hinder the conservation of traditional procedures. If the administration attempts to use the senates negatively as a means of undermining union authority by giving the senates broader authority, then this will not bode well for the survival of the traditional procedures. On the other hand, efforts to preserve senate procedures may be enhanced if the senate procedures are used as an alternate bargaining process to protect the

local faculty autonomy where the bargaining structure introduces into the negotiations parties external to the institution, for example, state-wide governing boards.

In sum, the type of consultation procedures which develop in a bargaining relationship will affect in major ways the ultimate impact of faculty bargaining on the structures, processes and relationships in higher education (see rationalization of practice, redistribution of authority and psychological climate).

Bargaining Unit Factionalism

Factions may arise within a bargaining unit whenever members of the unit have dissimilar interests. For example, there may be differences between different geographical locations, junior and senior faculty, males and females, minority groups, or different occupations. A bargaining unit with broad occupational diversity, for example, a unit including faculty, graduate students, non-teaching professionals and part-time faculty, is particularly susceptible to factionalism.

Generally, many of the differences are resolved internally, but when the intraorganizational bargaining process is unable to mediate the various interests, issues of concern to a particular group may be driven off the bargaining table as the faction seeks some differential advantage by bargaining informally with the administration.² It is expected that differences over the distribution of scarce resources may particularly factionalize the employees represented by an occupationally diverse bargaining unit.


In this form of alternate bargaining, the factions may bargain directly with management, either to reach an informal settlement or to convince management to adopt their position in the contract settlement (see Figure 3). Thus, the rules changes resulting from this type of activity may or may not be incorporated into the formal agreement.

Alternate bargaining between union factions and management also feeds back to the primary bargaining process in that pressure is exerted on the rest of the union to resolve the conflict through intraorganizational bargaining. If an agreeable informal settlement is not reached with management, the employee faction may request a new, more homogeneous bargaining unit. Since it is usually difficult for a bargaining unit to break up into several smaller units once it is established, the primary effect of this tactic would be to feedback on the primary bargaining process by creating pressure on negotiators to meet the faction's demands.

²It is possible that management would seek to negotiate directly with the union membership, or factions thereof, in order to undermine the union's bargaining power. In the private sector, this tactic has been labeled Boulwarism, after Lemeul Boulware of the General Electric Company.

Figure 8

MODEL OF ALTERNATE BARGAINING PROCESSES OF A BARGAINING
UNIT COMPRISED OF DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONS



Management Factionalism

The formation of factions within the administrative hierarchy, like bargaining unit factionalism, also creates opportunities for alternate bargaining. A primary cause of management factionalism is diffusion of management authority. Clearly, the educational systems where management authority is more widely diffused would have a more difficult time achieving internal consensus in the primary bargaining process. The managers at different levels may not share common values in respect to the needs of higher education. Moreover, the different selection procedures used to choose the managers (elected officials versus appointed officials) lead them to serve different constituencies. In addition, the diffusion of management authority promotes bargaining with different levels of management because they often have real or perceived independent jurisdictions. In sum, a broad diffusion of management authority increases the probability that the intraorganizational bargaining process will break down, leading to bargaining at different levels of management as the employee organizations seek out the optimum settlement.

The ability of the management team to achieve internal consensus reduces the opportunity for bargaining agents to bargain with various levels of management. Thus, where there is a lower diffusion of management authority concomitant with a high degree of internal management consensus, it is expected that more of the rules changes deriving from collective bargaining will come out of the primary negotiations and be incorporated into the bargaining agreement. However, when there is low internal consensus even with a narrower diffusion of management authority, alternate bargaining processes to circumvent the contract rules would be expected to develop.

The forms which alternate bargaining can take due to the diffusion of management authority are varied and tend to be dependent on the following factors:

1. Extent of diffusion of management authority;
2. Bargaining structure:
 - a. The level of management at which formal negotiations occur.
 - b. The composition of the bargaining unit:
 - i) Functional composition (two-year, four-year, graduate institutions)
 - ii) Institutional composition (number of institutions in the unit)
 - iii) Geographical composition.

Extent of Diffusion of Management Authority. It is expected that the extent of diffusion of management authority will be an important determinant of the type and frequency of alternate bargaining processes. Most public systems tend to have a high degree

of diffusion since the management hierarchy might include local campus administrators (industrial relations staff and academic administrators), local governing boards, state-wide governing boards, executive branch of government (industrial relations staff and budget staff as well as the governor) and the legislature. Diffusion of management authority is also a characteristic of private industry negotiations, particularly in company-wide or industry-wide negotiations. However, a broad diffusion of management authority appears to be more generalized in the public sector. In terms of higher education, those institutions where the management hierarchy primarily consists of the local administration and governing board fall into the low diffusion category. Private institutions and many community colleges have structures of this type.

Bargaining Structure. The bargaining structure of a given bargaining relationship is particularly determinative of the nature of the alternate bargaining processes which develop. The bargaining unit determines the functional, institutional, geographical (and occupational) composition of the employees represented at the bargaining table, and thereby defines the level of management at the bargaining table. Negotiations must occur at minimum at the lowest level of management common to the employees represented by the bargaining agent. In the case of public institutions of higher education, even if negotiations occur between the institutional administration and the union, the state is a party to the negotiations to the extent that state authorities have to approve the contract even if they do not sit at the bargaining table.

Functional composition refers to the variety of different kinds of institutions which are included in the bargaining unit. The State University of New York bargaining unit would be representative of a unit with a broad functional composition since it includes graduate centers, four-year colleges and two-year colleges. Institutional composition refers to the number of institutions of similar type which are included in the bargaining unit. All eight New Jersey State Colleges are in a single unit, while the Rutgers University bargaining unit covers one institution. Geographical composition refers to the fact that there may be different geographical areas represented in the bargaining unit. A bargaining unit covering one institution may or may not have geographical dispersion. The Rutgers faculty unit, for example, is spread across three major university centers. Units with a broad functional and institutional composition also have geographical dispersion.

The functional, institutional and geographical bargaining unit dimensions represent a continuum from the broadest possible unit dimensions to the narrowest. If a unit has functional dispersion then most of the other dimensions are represented as well. The occupational scope of a bargaining unit, discussed above under bargaining unit factionalism, is not necessarily related to the other dimensions of the composition of the bargaining unit, for it is possible to have a faculty-only unit with broad functional

dispersion. Several type of bargaining units will be discussed below in regard to the types of alternate bargaining which they produce.

The Single Institution Unit with no Geographical Diversity.
The simplest case of alternate bargaining occurs when the bargaining unit is comprised of the faculty at a single educational institution with only one campus location. In this case, the lowest common level of management would be the president and his corporate-wide administration. Management levels exist both above and below the lowest level of common management: department chairmen and deans are below the president and central administration; the governing board is the highest level of corporate-wide management; and, in public institutions, various levels of state management may exist above the institutional governing board -- the department administering that type of educational institution, the department regulating all institutions of higher education, the department regulating public employee bargaining, the governor, and the legislature.

Within the institution, alternate bargaining will occur with higher level management than the negotiators on the management side on issues which there is joint agreement between the union and higher level management that this is an issue subject to higher jurisdiction than the highest level of management at the bargaining table. The highest level of management at the bargaining table will be, at minimum, the lowest level of management that the employees represented by the bargaining agent have in common. At a single institution this would usually be the president or his representative.

Employee bargaining agents will usually attempt to bargain with management other than those at the negotiating table whenever a lack of consensus over policy or jurisdiction is perceived to exist among management levels. The motivation for the separate negotiations would be to exert pressure or leverage on the management representatives at the table or to go to the source of authority on certain issues. For example, the union negotiators may by-pass the president's negotiator and bargain directly with the president, or the bargaining agent may go to the governing board to exert pressure on the central administration negotiators.

External to the institution, the union can also "end run" the local governing authorities by directly negotiating with state authorities (several layers exist, as described above). Faculty unions may by-pass local administration negotiators where they perceive the local authorities do not have the authority to negotiate and/or to create pressure on the local negotiators. If they perceived incorrectly, the administrators on a local campus may lose prerogatives as state agencies (such as state-wide governing boards or the governor's collective bargaining staff) become involved through the bargaining process (and the contract administration process) with issues previously under local control. Thus, decision-making would become centralized beyond the local campus. Rules changes resulting from these by-passing activities would usually appear in the formal contract.

Negotiations between the union and higher level institutional management may result in a coalition between the union and the institutional management to bargain together or to individually pursue common goals with state administrative authorities or the legislature. This is likely to happen when both the employees and the institutional management view state management as "outsiders" who are interfering in local affairs. In this case the coalition would pressure state management to agree to terms of the contract which are subject to the latter's approval.

Alternate bargaining will occur between the union and a lower level of management on issues for which there is joint agreement that the proper jurisdiction is lower than the highest level of management at the bargaining table, for example, state agencies. Although representatives of state-wide management may not be physically present at the bargaining table, they expect to be informed about the course of negotiations and must approve the contract.

Alternate bargaining is done in these situations to avoid the purview of higher management, and/or to protect the local institution's autonomy. The union and lower management can settle issues directly, establishing either local rules which do not appear in the agreement or local deviations to circumvent the broader formal contract, or the parties may jointly agree to pursue rules changes through established governance procedures. An important effect of this type of coalition would be to preserve traditional governance procedures. In fact, a shared belief in preserving these procedures may reinforce this activity. However, these tactics are likely to be effective in the long run only where the local governing board has some degree of autonomy since the circumvented parties may not permit such activities once they become aware of them.

Negotiations between a union and lower management may lead the parties to the conclusion that the problem has to be settled at a higher level of management even though they initially thought it fell within lower management's jurisdiction. In this case, the parties may form a coalition and present their joint position to the higher level of management who may or may not be at the bargaining table.

The Geographically Diverse, Single Institution Unit. When the bargaining unit is composed of a single educational institution having more than one campus, the alternate bargaining processes include a new dimension in addition to those processes occurring at a single institution having one campus location. The complexity of institutional management increases when the bargaining unit is geographically diverse, because other levels of management below the president and central administration may be created and delegated authority to administer each campus.

The existence of campus-local administrators creates the possibility of negotiations between the union and campus-local

management on those issues which both parties agree are of mutual but local concern. For example, representatives of faculty working at the campus and the campus provost could negotiate over scheduling of classes, which is done locally. A campus-local bargaining agent and the campus administrator could directly negotiate local rules or local deviations, or they could refer local issues to another decision-making forum, for example, the local campus senate or committee on parking. If the local issue seems to have university-wide implications, the union, or coalition of unions, and campus administrator might form a coalition to jointly refer the issue to the primary negotiations done between institution-wide administrators and the bargaining agent. Generally, by dealing with issues of local concern, this type of alternate bargaining would tend to inhibit the centralizing tendency of collective bargaining, and is in part a response to this tendency. In time, these informal local negotiations may be institutionalized by becoming a formal part of the bargaining process.

The Institutionally Diverse Unit. An institutionally diverse bargaining unit is comprised of several corporately distinct institutions of the same type who negotiate together for one contract. For example, all fourteen Pennsylvania State Colleges are in the same unit as are all eighteen junior colleges in Minnesota.

In an institutionally diverse bargaining unit, the lowest common level of management is above the corporate-wide management of any single institution and probably would be at the state level -- the administrators of that type of institution, for example, a state board of education for state colleges, or a department of higher education. As a result, negotiation on issues needing higher jurisdiction cannot be held at the level of a single institution, as might happen with a bargaining unit composed of a single institution. When there is joint agreement that there is an issue subject to higher jurisdiction than the highest level of management at the bargaining table, then the joint agreement would have to be between the bargaining agent and a level of management above the state-wide governing board, if that board was the highest level of management at the table. The levels of management above a state-wide educational governing board could be comprised of the governor's office, his labor relation's staff, the budget director or the legislature.³

³A governor's labor relations staff is higher than the lowest level of management common to all the institutions in an institutionally diverse bargaining unit and in practice, a representative from the governor's staff is often at the negotiating table. A salient question is: under what circumstances does a representative from the governor's staff sit in on (and therefore lead, because of his higher authority) the negotiations; and under what circumstances is he merely (a) kept informed of the negotiations, or (b) presented with the contract for ratification?

Negotiation on issues for which there is joint agreement that these issues are subject to lower jurisdiction than the highest level of management at the table can occur at all levels below the highest level of management at the bargaining table. If the governor's labor staff negotiates at the bargaining table, negotiations with lower level management could include informal bargaining with lower level state authorities, for example, agreements between a department of higher education and the bargaining agent. Local negotiation could also occur with the corporate-wide management of a single institution, or with the local campus administration at a single institution having several campuses. Local bargaining processes between the union and lower management will take place both to form coalitions to exert pressure on higher management and to make rules tailored to the local situations. The inability of state-level negotiations to meet local needs may in time lead to institutionalized local negotiations at each institution. In the meantime, the circumvented level of management would more than likely view these local agreements as illegitimate.

The Functionally Diverse Unit. A functionally diverse bargaining unit includes several types of educational institutions in a single bargaining unit. The lowest level of common management would be a state-wide educational governing board or a governor's labor staff, if a department regulating all institutions of higher education did not exist. The legislature is rarely at the bargaining table, and issues requiring higher jurisdiction than the highest level of management at the bargaining table will often require lobbying efforts to change labor and other employee legislation. The union and any level of management below the legislature may form a coalition to lobby. However, to avoid the charge of collusion, the parties might lobby separately, or simply form a tacit coalition by not opposing the other party's efforts. The additional form of alternate bargaining occurring in this type of unit would be where the faculty from institutions of a similar type (for example, all graduate centers) would attempt to affect the overall negotiations in their favor by informally negotiating with the level of management at the bargaining table.

Management is a Common Employer

Whenever a particular level of management is the common employer of employees represented in several different bargaining units, then alternate bargaining is likely to occur between this level of management and coalitions which form among the bargaining units. The coalitions form around issues and problems which the different bargaining units perceive they have in common and/or issues for which a particular level of management has formulated a uniform policy for all the employees in the coalition. The coalitions are attempts to enhance the power of the employee organizations, and coalitions accomplish this in part by improving communications among the different employee groups.

In a diffuse management structure, coalition formation is likely to occur on several levels. At the lowest level, employee groups from a single campus or a single institution might form a

coalition to deal with a problem relevant only to that location, for example, parking. The coalition will seek a resolution of the problem with local management but failing there, may approach higher levels of management to create pressure on local management. Rules changes resulting from this type of bargaining would often involve extra-contractual changes in institution policies since a number of different bargaining units are involved.

At a higher level, when a level of management is the common employer of a number of different educational institutions, coalitions may form between different faculty groups or between faculty groups and other occupations. At the highest level, coalitions may form between employee groups in higher education and employee groups representing other types of state employees. For example, in New Jersey, medical and pension benefits for state employees are covered by statute and would require legislation to change. Coalitions may form among all bargaining units representing state employees to pressure for changes. In the higher education context, policies on class size, tenure or other matters may be established by state-wide governing boards, leading to coalitions against such boards made up of faculty bargaining agents.

It could be expected that coalitions would be unstable in the long-run due to the competitive nature of unions, and due to the fact that issues which are distributive among the bargaining units would tend to weaken or break up the coalitions. On the other hand, coalition formation could lead to a permanent tie among certain groups by establishing a precedent for a single unit. Such a decision, formalizing a defacto coalition among separate bargaining units at each of the state colleges, has recently been made for the New Jersey State Colleges.

Contract Administration Bargaining

Bargaining does not necessarily conclude after the contract is signed. Often the procedures required to implement the contract must be worked out. An example of rules application bargaining would be the development of a procedure for distributing merit money. It is also possible that bargaining will occur in the grievance process as the bargaining agent attempts to use the grievance process as a means of achieving other goals. The bargaining agent may stir up grievances to put pressure on contract negotiations. Moreover, decisions favorable to the bargaining agent and its members may overturn past management practices, thus resulting in policy changes outside of formal negotiations.

Impact of Alternate Bargaining

As a policy-making procedure, the alternate bargaining process in its various forms will have important impacts on educational institutions. Generally, the effects will be the same as the primary bargaining process -- the policies will contribute to a rationalization of management practices, a redistribution of authority, a change in the psychological climate and a reallocation of resources. Specifically, coalitions will affect the faculty-administra-

tion distribution of power. Union bypassing activities may contribute to a centralization of authority within the administrative hierarchy, affecting the administration -- administration distribution of authority. Another important effect of alternate bargaining is the prospect that traditional forms of faculty governance will be preserved. It is important that these effects of alternate bargaining, and others pointed out in the above discussion of the various forms of alternate bargaining, are accounted for in any research assessing the impact of faculty bargaining.

Feedback to Primary Bargaining Process

The feedback loop (dotted line) from the posited impacts of collective bargaining to the primary bargaining process (Figure 6) represents the incorporation of the unique effects of collective bargaining into the structures, processes and relationships of institutions of higher education and their subsequent effect on negotiations. Continuing faculty support for the bargaining process is dependent on the faculty organization's ability to alleviate sources of faculty dissatisfaction by bringing about changes in the institutional framework. If increased faculty rewards and control have been forthcoming from the negotiations process, these gains should reinforce acceptance of the bargaining process. As a faculty achieves particular gains from the bargaining process, it may then shift its attention to other needs or concerns (Hellriegel, et al., 1970).

Conceivably, the system impact of collective bargaining could be of such a nature as to elicit external legislative or court reactions, particularly if a strike extended the impact of bargaining beyond a particular institution by having an impact on the public. But it is unlikely that the outcome of a particular bargaining relationship, unless the outcome is extreme and/or the bargaining unit is large, will bring about responses from the legislature in the form of new laws regulating collective bargaining conduct. Particular settlements have some impact on the external market because this is, in part, how wage patterns and other benefits become transmitted and established. For example, the wage structure at the City University of New York no doubt has been widely admired and cited by other faculty organizations in a bargaining context.

V. CONCLUSIONS

It is expected that faculty bargaining will lead to a number of changes within institutions of higher education. Generally, institutions of higher education will become more democratic bureaucracies to the extent that more faculty share in more institutional decisions. However, by rationalizing and centralizing decision-making within the administrative hierarchy, collective bargaining also creates a more formalized bureaucracy than previously existed. Thus, by attempting to create or reinforce its professional autonomy through the bargaining process as a means of adapting to increasingly bureaucratic organizations, a faculty is also reinforcing the growth of bureaucracy in institutions of higher education.

Many commentators on the expected effects of faculty bargaining are also predicting that the collective bargaining process, by its very nature, will destroy traditional governance procedures by focusing on individual needs, by compromising educational policy for economic gains, and by substituting adversary decision-making procedures for rational discourse. However, generalizations concerning the impact of faculty bargaining are extremely hazardous without identifying the determinants of such change in institutions of higher education now engaged in faculty bargaining. Institutions of higher education have unique structural and technological characteristics which tend to make the effects of the interaction between the collective bargaining process and higher education complex.

The conceptual framework developed in the present study is not meant to be a complete statement of all possible sub-system interactions. Rather, it is a device for identifying in an organized manner major explanatory relationships. It remains for systematic research to refine and weigh the importance of the various relationships illustrated. Two important caveats are in order, however, for any research effort in higher education aimed at singling out the effects of faculty bargaining. First, other economic and political forces, particularly legislatures and state-wide governing boards, are operating to bring about similar changes in the administrative systems of higher education with regard to the rationalization and centralization of management authority. Indeed, it is these forces, in part, to which the faculty bargaining movement is responding. Thus, researchers must be prepared to separate out bargaining effects from changes brought about by adverse economic conditions and by legislatures and super-boards which are attempting to rationalize the expenditure of tax dollars for higher education.

Secondly, not only must a researcher separate the effects of bargaining from other ongoing forces affecting the institution, but adequate measures on the state of the institution before collective bargaining must be obtained to effectively assess the impact of bargaining. Post-bargaining impacts should not be measured against some ideal pre-bargaining state of affairs. To ignore or underestimate either of these factors is to attribute too much of the change in higher education to the bargaining process.

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